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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third District
Court. (R. 2216-25.) The appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court.
(See R. 2237.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing, on summary judgment, the claims of
Plaintiff Volvo Commercial Finance LLC, The Americas ("Volvo Finance11) against
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), for conversion, unjust enrichment,
and constructive trust. Volvo Finance asserted that Wells Fargo wrongfully received
nearly $700,000 in proceeds generated by the sale of 53 commercial trucks, when Volvo
Finance had a perfected purchase money security interest in the trucks and all proceeds
thereof. The seller of the trucks transferred the funds into its account with Wells Fargo,
and Wells Fargo seized those funds in repayment of an overdraft advance. This issue will
require the consideration of the following legal question:
a.

How do the governing tracing rules apply when a debtor transfers

funds from a commingled account to a new account and then dissipates the funds
remaining in the first account; may a creditor with a claim to the funds trace them to the
second account, or does the transfer defeat the creditor's interest in those funds?
Additionally, Volvo Finance anticipates that Wells Fargo may raise one or
both of the following issues in its opposing brief:

-1 .

b.

Whether Volvo Finance's claim is barred under Revised Article 9 of

the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, even though Revised Article 9 was not in effect
when the events giving rise to this litigation occurred.
c.

Whether Volvo Finance's claim is barred under the purported

"ordinary course" defense discussed in a comment to Section 9-306 of former Article 9.
Volvo Finance addressed these issues in its memorandum opposing Wells Fargo's
summary judgment motion, R. 1451 -81.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences are viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and no deference is given to the trial court's
ruling. Rg,, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 855-56 (Utah 1998); Badger v.
Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Former Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306:
"Proceeds" — Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral or
debtor's insolvency [Repealed effective July 1, 2001].
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, lease, exchange,
collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable
by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the
extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security
agreement. Any payments or distributions made with respect to investment
property collateral are proceeds. Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the
like are "cash proceeds." All other proceeds are "noncash proceeds."
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise provides, a
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the

secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in
any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.

Utah Code Ann. $ 70A-9a-709(U:
Priority.
(1) This act [Revised Article 9] determines the priority of conflicting claims
to collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were
established before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines
priority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This lawsuit arises out of the collapse of the "Great Basin" chain of commercial
truck dealerships in Salt Lake City and throughout the Intermountain West. Four of the
dealerships had identical "floor plan" financing agreements with Plaintiff Volvo Finance,
under which Volvo Finance advanced funds to enable Great Basin to purchase truck
inventory. The floor plan agreements granted Volvo Finance a purchase money security
interest in the trucks financed and all proceeds thereof. To perfect its security interest,
Volvo Finance filed UCC-1 Financing Statements in each state in which the dealerships
operated.
Great Basin did much of its banking through Defendant Wells Fargo. Each of the
Great Basin dealerships made deposits into its local Wells Fargo branch, and the funds
were automatically swept into a central "concentration account" at the end of each day.
In late December 2000, Wells Fargo paid several items out of the Concentration
Account, even though the Account had insufficient funds to cover them, creating an

$800,000+ overdraft in the account. On December 29, 2000, Great Basin transferred
$900,000 from an account at First Security Bank (the "First Security Account") to the
Concentration Account. Wells Fargo used the funds transferred on December 29 to repay
itself for the advances Wells Fargo had made to cover the overdrafts. A significant
portion of the funds that Great Basin transferred into the Concentration Account,
however, were proceeds subject to Volvo Finance's security interest. About a week later,
Great Basin filed for bankruptcy, owing Volvo Finance millions of dollars.
Volvo Finance has determined that under the applicable tracing rules, including
the lowest intermediate balance rule, approximately $693,000 of the $900,000 transferred
to Wells Fargo on December 29, 2000, was traceable to the sales of 53 trucks which
Volvo Finance had financed under the Floor Plan Agreements (these 53 trucks are
referred to as the "Volvo-Financed Vehicles"). After its demand for payment was
rejected, Volvo Finance initiated this lawsuit.
A key issue during the litigation was the proper treatment of two transfers Great
Basin had made on December 21 and 22. On those days, Great Basin transferred a total
of $2 million from the Concentration Account to the First Security Account. The funds
remaining in the Concentration Account were soon dissipated, but the funds going to the
First Security Account were fully preserved until the December 29 transfer back to Wells
Fargo. Volvo Finance's tracing analysis concluded that under the lowest intermediate
balance rule, the $2 million transferred on December 21 and 22 included all sales
proceeds that were then in the Concentration Account. Wells Fargo disagrees.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, ruling that, as a matter
of law, Wells Fargo did not receive any proceeds traceable to the Volvo-Financed
Vehicles. The trial court adopted Wells Fargofs treatment of the $2 million transferred on
December 21 and 22, concluding that the proceeds from the Vehicles remained in the
Concentration Account to the greatest extent possible, and as such Volvo Finance lost its
claim to those funds when the Concentration Account was dissipated.
Volvo Finance now appeals. There is no authority supporting the trial court's
application of the tracing rules. To the contrary, courts have long held that when a debtor
or trustee transfers funds from one account to another and then depletes the first account,
the creditor or beneficiary may follow the funds into the new account. That is exactly
what Volvo Finance asked the trial court to do.
Course of Proceedings
Volvo Finance filed its complaint on June 13, 2002, stating claims for conversion,
unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. (R. 1-15.) On March 19, 2003, Wells Fargo
filed its amended answer, denying liability and raising several affirmative defenses. (R.
71-81.)
On September 10, 2003, Volvo Finance moved for partial summary judgment,
seeking a determination of liability only. (R. 761-63.) On November 12, 2004, Wells
Fargo moved for summary judgment on all claims. (R. 813-15.) A hearing took place
on the motions on May 17, 2005. (R. 2209.) On November 14, 2005, the trial court
issued a written order granting Wells Fargo's motion. (R. 2210-15, Add. Ex. 1.)

On December 5, 2005, the trial court entered Judgment dismissing all claims with
prejudice. (R. 2216-25.) Volvo Finance filed its notice of appeal on December 7. (R.
2226-28.)
Statement of Facts
A.

Background: Volvo Finance's Financing Arrangements with Great
Basin and Security Interest in Great Basin's Collateral.

As of December 2000, Volvo Finance had entered into Floor Plan Financing
Agreements and Security Agreements with four of the Great Basin Dealerships:
(a) Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. (based in Salt Lake City); (b) Arizona Great Basin
Trucks, Inc. (Phoenix); (c) Great Basin Southwest Trucks, Inc. (Albuquerque); and
(d) Idaho Great Basin Trucks, Inc. (Boise). (See R. 181-266, 536-56.) The Financing
and Security Agreements, identical in their relevant parts, granted Volvo Finance a
security interest in "all new and used trucks, motor vehicles, tractors, trailers and similar
equipment of Debtor [Great Basin] . . . and all proceeds of the foregoing." (R. 539, 551
(emphasis added).)
The Financing Agreements provided that upon the sale of a vehicle, Great Basin
was to "immediately pay to Company [Volvo Finance] an amount equal to the unpaid
balance of the amount advanced with respect to the item of inventory sold." (See R.
540.) All funds due to Volvo Finance were to be sent immediately by wire transfer, "on
the same business day if possible, and if not, then on the next business day." (Id.) Volvo
Finance filed UCC-1 Financing Statements describing its security interest in the vehicles
and proceeds in the pertinent jurisdictions. (See R. 299-322, 567-69.) Between July

1999 and December 2000, Volvo Finance financed Great Basin's purchase of the 53
vehicles at issue in this lawsuit (the "Volvo-Financed Vehicles1'). (See R. 571-90.)
This arrangement was successful for a number of years, but a routine audit
conducted in September 2000 revealed that Great Basin was not timely remitting funds to
Volvo Finance. On December 8, 2000, after several rounds of follow-up correspondence
and audits, Volvo Finance formally notified Great Basin that it was in default under their
agreements, and that Volvo Finance would not release the title certificates or "MSOs" for
any sold vehicles unless Volvo Finance received payment for those vehicles. (See R.
592-96.) Unfortunately, Great Basin continued to breach its obligations under the Floor
Plan Agreements: From December 7 through December 29, 2000, Great Basin sold the
53 vehicles, receiving proceeds in excess of $5 million, and failed to pay any of that
money to Volvo Finance. (See R. 604-06.) By the end of December 2000, the Great
Basin Entities owed Volvo Finance approximately $30 million. (See R. 706, f 9.)
B.

The Bank Transactions,

As of December 2000, Great Basin held a number of "Dealership Accounts" with
Wells Fargo, one for each of its individual dealerships. (See R. 598-606.) Great Basin
also held a "Concentration Account" with Wells Fargo. (See R. 598, 604.) Each
dealership would deposit funds, including sales proceeds, into the Dealership Accounts,
and each night the funds in those accounts were automatically swept into the
Concentration Account. (See R. 824.)
At the close of business on December 20, 2000, the Concentration Account held
just under $3 million, including approximately $1.7 million in proceeds attributable to the

sale of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. (See Tracing Analysis, R. 1484, Add. Ex. 2.1)
Over the next two days, Great Basin transferred exactly $2 million from the Concentration Account to a newly opened account at First Security (the "First Security
Account"). (See id.) All funds remaining in the Concentration Account after the transfer
were dissipated by December 26. (Id.)
On December 27, over $1 million worth of items were presented to Wells Fargo
for payment out of the Concentration Account. (See R. 614.) Wells Fargo paid those
items, even though the Concentration Account lacked sufficient funds to cover them.
(Concentration Account Statement, R. 614, Add. Ex. 3; R. 662-63, 682-86.) As of the
close of business on December 27, the Concentration Account was overdrawn by
$790,160.73. (See Statement at R. 615.)
The following day, additional items were presented to Wells Fargo for payment
out of the Concentration Account. (See id. at R. 614.) Wells Fargo paid those as well,
even though, once again, the account lacked sufficient funds. (See id. at R. 614-15; R.
664-65, 687-92.) Thus, as of the close of business on December 28, 2000, the overdraft
had reached $828,951.36. (See Statement at R. 615.)
On December 29, 2000, Great Basin transferred $900,000 from the First Security
Account to the Concentration Account. (See id. at R. 612; R, 657, 692.) Wells Fargofs
system automatically subtracted the amount of the previously existing overdrafts (or

In addition to being included as Addendum Exhibit 2, a separate removable color
copy of the Analysis has been placed in the pocket on the inside back cover of each copy
of this brief. Counsel would be happy to provide additional copies if requested.

"negative balance1') of $828,951.36, thus making only $71,048.64 available for use by the
Great Basin Entities. (See Statement at R. 615; R. 689-93, 698-99.)
Volvo Finance's expert has testified that the $900,000 transfer from the First
Security Account to the Concentration Account included $693,132 of proceeds traceable
to the sale of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. (R. 629; Tracing Analysis, Add. Ex. 2.)
Wells Fargo maintains that no proceeds were transferred.
C.

Wells Fargo Ignores Volvo Finance's Security Interest in the Proceeds
Despite Actual and Constructive Notice,

Wells Fargo admitted in depositions that it did essentially no investigation or
analysis of Great Basin's financial status before deciding to pay the items for which
insufficient funds existed in the Concentration Account. Wells Fargo failed to consider
(a) whether Great Basin was in debt to others besides Wells Fargo, (b) how much Great
Basin may have owed to those other creditors, (c) whether Great Basin was in default on
any of its debt obligations to other creditors, (d) whether any of Great Basin's debt
obligations were secured, or even (e) whether any other creditor of Great Basin had an
interest in the funds that Great Basin was going to transfer to cover the overdrafts. (R.
694, 1004-05, 1106-07.)

Wells Fargo did not search the UCC filings to determine

whether any creditors had security interests in any of Great Basin's property. (R. 604,
700.) Wells Fargo knew, however, that Great Basin's floor plan financing was being
provided by Volvo Finance, and that Great Basin's debt obligations to Volvo Finance
were secured at least by Great Basin's inventory, i.e., commercial trucks. (R. 1004-05.)

Wells Fargo also knew that the funds Great Basin was going to use to cover the
overdrafts were likely proceeds of the sale of commercial trucks. (See id)
D.

Great Basin's Collapse.

Great Basinfs house of cards soon collapsed, and on January 5, 2001, Great Basin
filed for bankruptcy. (R. 831.) At the time, Great Basin owed Volvo Finance more than
$30 million for floor plan financing. (R. 1314.) Volvo Finance therefore retained the
local accounting firm of Nielson Elggren to assist it in examining Great Basin's records
and tracing the funds from the sales of Volvo-Financed Vehicles. (R. 618.) Using the
lowest intermediate balance rule ("LIBR"), Nielson Elggren determined that
approximately $693,000 of the $900,000 transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29,
2000, were proceeds traceable to the sales of the Vehicles. (Tracing Analysis, Add. Ex.
2.)
Nielson Elggrenfs tracing analysis also revealed that in addition to the proceeds
that were transferred to the Wells Fargo Concentration Account on December 29, a
significant sum of proceeds (roughly $3.5 million) ended up in the possession of Zions
Bank, with whom Great Basin had other accounts and other obligations. (Id.; R. 605-06,
619-20.) Volvo Finance presented its tracing analysis to Zions Bank, and recognizing
Volvo Finance's superior interest, Zions ultimately repaid a significant portion of these
funds to Volvo Finance. (R. 488.)
After reaching its settlement with Zions concerning the proceeds that ended up
with Zions, Volvo Finance sought payment from Wells Fargo for the proceeds that were
transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29. (Id.) But instead of acknowledging Volvo

Finance's right to the proceeds of the Vehicles, as Zions had done, Wells Fargo denied
liability. (Id)
E.

The Litigation,

Volvo Finance therefore initiated this lawsuit, stating claims for conversion, unjust
enrichment, and a constructive trust. Wells Fargo did not seriously dispute Volvo
Finance's security interest in the Vehicles or the facts regarding the sale of the Vehicles
and the deposit and transfers of the funds. (See Stipulation of Facts, R. 2193-2208.)
Wells Fargo's expert, however, disputed Nielson Elggren's application of the tracing
rules. (See R. 1217-76.) Wells Fargo also raised a number of affirmative defenses,
asserting that even if Wells Fargo received funds traceable to the Vehicles, Wells Fargo
would not be liable. (R. 76-79.)
After discovery, Volvo Finance moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a
ruling that Wells Fargo was liable for conversion to the extent it received funds traceable
to the Vehicles. (R. 481-763.) Volvo Finance asked for a ruling that it had a superior
right to any proceeds that were transferred to the Concentration Account on December
29, 2000, and that Wells Fargo's affirmative defenses lacked merit as a matter of law.
Wells Fargo filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the trial court to
dismiss all of Volvo Finance's claims. (R. 813-1141.) Wells Fargo argued that under
LIBR, the first funds taken out of an account must be considered non-proceeds, even if
those funds are merely transferred between the debtor's own accounts. (R. 832-40.) As
such, Wells Fargo argued, the $2 million Great Basin transferred from the Concentration
Account to the First Security Account included primarily non-proceeds, and the funds

that were transferred back on December 29 did not include any traceable proceeds at all.

(14)
Wells Fargo sought judgment on two additional grounds. First, Wells Fargo
contended that even if funds were traceable to the Vehicles, Wells Fargo had a superior
right to those funds under Revised UCC Article 9. (R. 840-42.) Second, Wells Fargo
argued that under the purported "ordinary course" defense, based on a statement in a
comment to pre-revision UCC 9-306, Wells Fargo had a superior right to the funds,
notwithstanding Volvo Finance's perfected purchase money security interest, because
Wells Fargo did not have actual knowledge of Volvo Finance's claim to those specific
funds. (R. 842-49.) (Volvo Finance's motion had previously raised the "ordinary course"
issue, asking the court to strike Wells Fargo's 13th and 14th affirmative defenses, which
were based on that provision.)
Opposing the motion, Volvo Finance explained that under the lowest intermediate
balance rule, funds do not lose their status as proceeds when they are transferred between
a debtor's own accounts. (R. 1451-64.) Volvo Finance cited nine cases, plus treatises, a
law review article, and two restatements, supporting this position. (R. 1456-60.)
Volvo Finance further pointed out that Revised Article 9 did not govern the
present case since that revision was not effective until July 1, 2001. (R. 1464-67.) Volvo
Finance also explained that in Insley Manufacturing Co. v. Draper Bank & Trust 717
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986), a case nearly identical to the present one, the Utah Supreme
Court held, explicitly, that a secured party's right to trace proceeds prevails over the

rights of a setting-off bank even if the bank does not have actual knowledge of the
secured party's interest. (R. 1467-80.)
The cross-motions were argued on May 17, 2005, after which the trial court took
the matter under advisement. On November 14, the court granted Wells Fargo's motion
on the ground that the December 21-22 transfers from the Concentration Account to the
First Security Account defeated Volvo Finance's claim to the funds. (R. 2210-15, Add.
Ex. 1.) Despite the case law and other sources Volvo Finance supplied, the trial court
stated that there was ,fno authority" supporting Volvo Finance's treatment of the transfers.
(See id. at R. 2213.) The trial court did not address the two additional grounds Wells
Fargo had raised.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In granting summary judgment against Volvo Finance, the trial court disregarded
over a century's worth of authority. Courts in several jurisdictions have held that when a
trustee or debtor commingles trust funds and personal funds in an account, transfers some
of those funds to a new account, and then dissipates the funds remaining in the original
account, the transferred funds remain subject to the beneficiaryfs claim. These courts
have expressly rejected the argument that Wells Fargo made below and the trial court
adopted, i.e., that the first funds taken out of an account must be treated as the trustee's
own funds, even if the trustee retains full possession and control over those funds.
Notably, neither Wells Fargo nor the trial court was able to cite a single case extending
LIBR to cover a transfer between accounts held by the trustee.

11

Further, the trial court's ruling frustrates the reasoning behind LIBR. The lowest
intermediate balance rule presumes that a trustee acts honestly, and that when a trustee
spends money from a commingled account, he or she is spending personal funds first. By
this presumption, the rule preserves the trust account to the greatest extent possible. The
trial court overturned this presumption by ruling that when Great Basin transferred funds
to the First Security Account and then dissipated the Concentration Account, Great Basin
was actually spending trust money and retaining its own funds. Further, by ruling that a
transfer between accounts was enough to deprive Volvo Finance of its claim to the sales
proceeds in Great Basin's accounts, the trial court exalted form over substance; the
important question in tracing funds is whether the trustee kept the funds or dissipated
them, but the trial court's ruling focused on the method the trustee used to keep the funds.
The Court should therefore hold that the trial court erred in its interpretation of LIBR.
The trial court's ruling cannot be justified on the basis of the two other grounds
Wells Fargo raised below, either. Wells Fargo's reliance on revised Article 9 is clearly
improper, as that Article did not go into effect until July 2001, and the Revised Article
itself states that it does not apply where relative priorities were established prior to the
Act's effective date. When Wells Fargo's conversion took place in December 2000, the
parties' relative priorities were established, as Volvo Finance already had a perfected
purchase money security interest in Great Basin's inventory and the proceeds thereof.
When Revised Article 9 was enacted, creditors in Volvo Finance's position were given
until July 2001 to take the additional steps required to protect their interest in a debtor's

proceeds, and it would be unfair and illogical to hold that Volvo Finance's claim is barred
because it had not taken those steps by December 2000.
Finally, Wells Fargofs "ordinary course" defense should be rejected as a matter of
law. The ordinary course defense is not even part of the UCC; it appears only in a
comment to one of the sections in Article 9. Moreover, Utah law precludes application of
the ordinary course defense, as the reasoning behind the defense flatly contradicts the
reasoning of Insley. Even apart from Insley, cases from other jurisdictions establish that
in situations like the one at present, i.e., where a bank lends money to a customer after the
customer is already in debt to secured creditors, a bank may not rely on the ordinary
course defense to claim proceeds from inventory covered by a senior security interest. At
the very least, even if the ordinary course defense were viable in Utah, Wells Fargo did
not establish that the defense applies as a matter of law. As such, summary judgment was
simply not appropriate.

1C

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST VOLVO FINANCE
A,

Under the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule, Volvo Finance's claim is not
defeated by Great Basin's transfer of $2 million from the Concentration
Account to the First Security Account on December 21 and 22, 2000.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the lowest

intermediate balance rule bars Volvo Finance's claim for conversion.
1.

Preliminary Point: Wells Fargo is liable for conversion to the extent
Wells Fargo received proceeds of Great Basin's sale of the VolvoFinanced Vehicles.

Under Utah law, conversion is an "act of interference with a chattel, done without
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and
possession." Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). While
conversion involves intentional conduct, it does not require a conscious wrongdoing, but
"only an intent to exercise dominion and control over the goods inconsistent with the
owner's right." IcL In the context of secured transactions, if one creditor exercises
control over certain collateral in the face of a second creditor's superior security interest,
the first creditor is liable to the second for conversion. See, e.g., Insley, 717 P.2d at
1344-47.
a.

Volvo Finance had a security interest in all proceeds of
the Volvo-Financed Vehicles.

A valid security interest is created when a written security agreement is signed by
the debtor describing the collateral, value is given by the creditor, and the debtor has
rights in the collateral. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Utah

1974). See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-203 (2000).2 Volvo Finance clearly obtained a
security interest in all inventory owned and acquired by Great Basin when it entered into
the Security Agreements with each of the Great Basin entities. (See R. 551-56.) The
inventory is described in the Security Agreements, Volvo Finance gave value by
advancing funds to purchase the inventory, and Great Basin held the rights to the
inventory.
Volvo Finance's security interest also extended to i\\Q proceeds generated by Great
Basin's sale of commercial trucks financed by Volvo Finance.

Indeed, the UCC

provisions then in effect explicitly stated that a security interest "continues in any
identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor." Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-306(2) (2000). Further, the Security Agreements specifically stated that Volvo
Finance held a security interest in all proceeds received from the disposition of Great
Basin's inventory. (R. 551.) Accordingly, Volvo Finance holds a security interest in
Great Basin's collateral as described in the Security Agreements, including all proceeds
obtained from the disposition of that collateral.
Additionally, Volvo Finance perfected its security interest in Great Basin's
collateral and proceeds by filing UCC-1 Financing Statements in the pertinent
jurisdictions. (See R. 567-69.) Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-203, -302, -304 (2000). A
security interest in proceeds "is a continuously perfected security interest if the interest in

Except as otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the version of the UCC
that was in effect in December 2000, when the relevant actions took place. Copies of the
pertinent sections of the 2000 version of Utah's UCC Article 9 are included in Addendum
Exhibit 4.
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the original collateral was perfected . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3) (2000)
(emphasis added). As Volvo Finance's security interest in the trucks was perfected by
filing the UCC-1 Financing Statements, Volvo Finance's security interest in the proceeds
of those trucks was also perfected. Therefore, Volvo Finance had a perfected purchase
money security interest in the proceeds received from Great Basin's sale of the VolvoFinanced Vehicles.
The basic dispute in this case is whether Volvo Finance or Wells Fargo had
superior rights to the funds that Great Basin transferred into the Concentration Account
on December 29, 2000. Regarding the portion of those funds that were traceable to the
sale of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles, the law clearly favors Volvo Finance.
b.

Volvo Finance's interest in traceable proceeds was
superior to any interest Wells Fargo claimed.

Because Volvo Finance had a perfected purchase money security interest in both
the Volvo-Financed Vehicles and the proceeds thereof, Volvo Finance's interest takes
precedence over any interest Wells Fargo could possibly claim. The seminal case on this
issue is Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986)
(copy included as Addendum Exhibit 5). In Insley, the plaintiff manufacturer sold, on
credit, a $100,000+ backhoe to one of its retail dealers, Schneider, taking a security
interest in the backhoe and all proceeds thereof.

Schneider sold the backhoe and

deposited the proceeds into its checking account with Draper Bank. The bank, however,
had previously advanced funds to Schneider to cover several overdraft checks on that
account, creating a negative balance. When Schneider deposited the proceeds from the

backhoe sale, the bank credited the deposit to the account and then took those funds to
repay itself for the overdrafts. Schneider was thus unable to repay Insley the money it
owed on the backhoe and filed bankruptcy a few months later.
Insley sued the Bank for conversion of the proceeds of the backhoe. The trial
court granted summary judgment in Insley's favor, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
First, the court explained that because Insley entered into a security agreement to secure
the purchase price of the backhoe, filed a UCC-1 financing statement, and delivered the
backhoe, Insley had a perfected purchase money security interest under Article 9. See id
at 1343. The court further pointed out that when the backhoe was sold, Insley lost its
security interest in the backhoe, but "its interest remained in the identifiable cash
proceeds," and that when the funds were deposited into Schneider's checking account,
that account "contained, in part, identifiable cash proceeds from the [backhoe] sale." Id.
The court then concluded that Insley's security interest in the funds took priority
over the Bank's right to use those funds to repay its advances, reasoning that "Insley's
purchase money security interest in the proceeds was perfected," while the Bank was
simply an unsecured creditor. IdL at 1347. The court therefore determined that "the
Code's priority rules require that Insley's interest must prevail over Draper's right of
setoff." Id

The court noted that under the UCC, "a security agreement is effective

according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors," and that '"[t]he effect of [Section 9-201] is to give the Article Nine
secured party, upon a debtor's default, priority over "anyone, anywhere, anyhow" except
as otherwise provided by the remaining Code priority rules.'" Id. (emphasis added,

_ io_

citation omitted). Accord GMAC v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 18 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2000); C&
H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989).
The present case is functionally identical to Insley. Just as the manufacturer did in
Insley, Volvo Finance loaned funds to a dealer, Great Basin, to enable the dealer to buy
inventory, pursuant to a security agreement that gave Volvo Finance a security interest in
the inventory and all proceeds thereof. Just as in Insley, the dealer issued checks for
which there were insufficient funds in its account, and the bank (in this case Wells Fargo)
decided to advance funds to the dealer to cover those checks. Finally, just as in Insley,
the bank decided to take proceeds from the collateral and use those funds to repay the
dealer's overdraft debt to the bank, notwithstanding that Volvo Finance had a prior
perfected security interest in those funds. Therefore, just as in Insley, Wells Fargo is
liable for conversion.
c.

Volvo Finance's Tracing Analysis.

The extent of Volvo Finance's claim depends on its ability to trace proceeds of
Great Basin's sales of the 53 Volvo-Financed Vehicles into the $900,000 Great Basin
transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29, 2000. Volvo Finance's tracing analysis
(Add. Ex. 2; also inserted in the pocket inside the back cover) shows that the December
29 transfer included roughly $693,000 in traceable proceeds. As shown on the Analysis
(in the "Total Beginning Balance" line across the top of the page), the Concentration
Account (Account 409-8328487) held $2,989,075 at the start of business on December
21, 2000. Of these funds, $1,691,585 were proceeds traceable to the sale of 25 of the

Volvo-Financed Vehicles (printed in red ink and identified as "Trust Money").3 The
remaining $1,297,489 constituted non-proceeds (black ink). On December 21, Great
Basin transferred $1.5 million from the Concentration Account to the newly created First
Security Account. (These funds were not received into the First Security Account until
the next day.) On December 22, Great Basin deposited $100,334 in proceeds into the
Concentration Account (from the sale of another Vehicle) and transferred another
$500,000 from the Concentration Account to the First Security Account.4 When those
transfers were complete, $661,274 was left in the Concentration Account (as shown by
the "Ending Balance" line for December 22). By December 26, Great Basin had fully
depleted the funds left in the Concentration Account.
Because Great Basin kept control over the funds transferred to the First Security
Account, Mr. Judd concluded that all sales proceeds in the Concentration Account on
December 21 and 22 were included in the $2 million transferred to the First Security
Account. (When some funds are spent and some retained, LIBR presumes that trust
funds were retained.) Therefore, the $2 million transfer included $1,791,919 in proceeds
Wells Fargo disputes Volvo Finance's conclusions as to what portion of the
account balance constituted proceeds. That dispute is not material to the present discussion, however, because the discussion is for illustrative and background purposes only.
4
These transfers are somewhat difficult to follow on the Tracing Analysis. The
table on the top of the Tracing Analysis addresses the Wells Fargo Concentration
Account. The first $1.5 million transferred out appears as a negative entry in the
12/21/00 column. Because the Tracing Analysis concludes that these funds were
comprised entirely of sales proceeds, the "(1,500,000)" is in red ink. The second
$500,000 is shown as two negative entries in the 12/22 column: "(291,919)" in red, i.e.,
proceeds, and "(208,081)" in black.
The bottom table shows the First Security Account. Because the entire $2 million
arrived in the First Security Account on December 22, the combined transfer is shown as
two positive entries on the 12/22 column: "1,791,919" in red, and "208,081" in black.
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(the $1,691,585 in proceeds that were already in the Concentration Account on December
21, plus the additional $100,334 deposited into that account on December 22). Thus, as
of the end of the day on December 22, the First Security Account held $1,791,919 in
proceeds.
On December 27, Great Basin deposited $32,630 from the sale of one more truck
directly into the First Security Account, bringing the total proceeds in the First Security
Account to $1,824,549 ($1,791,919 + $32,630).
As of the start of business on December 29, the First Security Account had a
balance of $2,230,002, including that $1,824,549 in proceeds and $405,453 in nonproceeds. That day, Great Basin deposited another $1,882,967 in proceeds (from the sale
of 26 Volvo-Financed Vehicles) directly into the First Security Account, bringing the
total proceeds in the account to $3,707,516 ($1,824,549 + $1,882,967). Additional nonproceeds went in and out of the account that day, so that prior to the $900,000 transfer
back to the Concentration Account, the First Security Account held $3,914,385, including
$3,707,516 in proceeds and $206,868 in non-proceeds.5 When Great Basin transferred
the $900,000 back to the Concentration Account, the transfer included all $206,868 in
non-proceeds, plus $693,132 in proceeds.6

5

(The remaining $3,014,385 in proceeds

Because of rounding, the figures in the Tracing Analysis do not always match up
precisely. Also, the figures stated here in the text do not directly appear in the Tracing
Analysis because the analysis shows the balances in the accounts after the $900,000 was
transferred. The Tracing Analysis shows $1,824,549 in proceeds in the account at the
start of December 29, plus the $1,882,967 deposited that day, adding up to the
$3,707,516 in proceeds mentioned in the text.
6
Because the $900,000 transferred on December 29 from the First Security
Account to the Concentration Account was immediately dissipated, Volvo Finance and

stayed in the First Security Account, were traced to Zions Bank, and, to a large extent,
were ultimately recovered by Volvo Finance.) Thus, Volvo Finance is suing Wells Fargo
for the $693,132 in proceeds transferred to the Concentration Account and seized by
Wells Fargo.
d.

Wells Fargo's Treatment.

Wells Fargo, however, contends that the December 21 and 22 transfers included,
at most, only $1,066,584 in proceeds. (See R. 1276, Add. Ex. 6.) Wells Fargo asserts
that under LIBR, the first funds taken out of a commingled account are assumed to be
free of a creditor's security interest, even if the debtor retains control and possession of
those funds. Thus, under Wells Fargofs view, the funds transferred on December 21 and
22 must be treated, to the greatest extent possible, as if they included all raw-proceeds.
Because there were $933,416 in non-proceeds in the account at the time, Wells Fargo
asserts that the $2 million transferred includes those $933,416 in non-proceeds, with the
remainder ($1,066,584) treated as proceeds subject to Volvo Finance's interest. All other

Wells Fargo agree that under LIBR, the transfer is deemed to include any non-proceeds
that were then in the First Security Account, with any remainder made up by proceeds.
7
Wells Fargo's modified tracing analysis, Addendum Exhibit 6, is difficult to read,
but Wells Fargo's conclusions can be derived from Volvo Finance's Tracing Analysis
(Add. Ex. 2), as follows. As noted in the text, the Concentration Account held
$1,297,489 in non-proceeds (black ink) at the start of the day on December 21. During
that day, four deposits of non-proceeds were made into the Concentration Account
($29,099, $9,180, $1,789, and $2,500), and $406,641 was disbursed from the Account,
bringing the total non-proceeds to $933,416. Wells Fargo asserts that all of these nonproceeds were included in the December 21 transfer of $1,500,000 to the First Security
Account. Volvo Finance, on the other hand, asserts that these non-proceeds remained in
the Concentration Account, which is why the "non-proceeds" balance at the start of
December 22 was $933,415. (Once again, numbers do not match up exactly because of
rounding.)

no

funds in the Concentration Account on December 21 subject to Volvo Finance's interest
stayed in that account and were lost when that account was dissipated.
Wells Fargo thus asserts that on December 29, prior to the $900,000 transfer, the
First Security Account included, at most, $2,982,181 in proceeds,8 with the remaining
$932,203 as non-proceeds. Id So when Great Basin transferred $900,000, that transfer
included only non-proceeds, and all proceeds remained in the First Security Account.
Under this approach, Wells Fargo would not have received any funds subject to Volvo
Finance's interest, and as such Volvo Finance would have no claim.
The parties' respective treatments of the December 21-22 transfers, and the effect
of those treatments, are set forth in the following table (proceeds shown in bold):

Dec. 21-22 Transfers
to First Security Acct
($2,000,000 Total)
Volvo Finance

1,791,919
208,081

Wells Fargoy

1,066,584
933,416

Dec. 29 Balance in
Dec. 29 Transfer to
First Security Acct
Wells Fargo Acct
Pre-$900K Transfer
($900,000)
($3,914,384)
3,707,516
693,132
206,868
206,868
2,982,181
932,203

0
900,000

Once again, the parties agree that $1,915,597 ($32,630 + $1,882,967) in proceeds
was deposited into the First Security Account on December 27 and 29. The parties also
agree that when Great Basin transferred $900,000 from the First Security Account to the
8

The $1,066,584 transferred on December 21 and 22, plus the $32,630 deposited
on December 27 and the $1,882,967 deposited on December 29.
9
Wells Fargofs expert raised other challenges to Volvo Financed conclusions
regarding the amount of sales proceeds that were in the relevant accounts at any given
time. The numbers presented in the table, and in the discussion in the text, represent
Wells Fargo's position for purposes of the summary judgment motion only.

Concentration Account on December 29 and immediately dissipated the funds, LIBR presumes that the transfer included all non-proceeds then in the First Security Account.
Thus, while following all of the numbers may be dizzying, the controlling question on
appeal is rather straightforward: When Great Basin transferred the $2 million from the
Concentration Account to the First Security Account and dissipated the funds left in the
Concentration Account, should the transferred funds be treated as including primarily
proceeds, or primarily non-proceeds? Put another way, to the extent the funds in the
Concentration Account prior to those transfers were subject to Volvo Finance's security
interest, did the transfer to the First Security Account preserve Volvo Finance's interest,
or defeat that interest?
2.

The Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR).

As shown in the preceding sections, both Volvo Finance and Wells Fargo purport
to apply LIBR, the commonly accepted (and governing in Utah) rule, originally
developed for trust law, for tracing funds out of a commingled account. LIBR relies on
two basic presumptions. First, when a trustee commingles trust funds and personal (nontrust) funds, and then spends some of the commingled money, the law ordinarily presumes that the trustee spends his personal funds first, thus preserving the trust funds to
the greatest extent possible. Second, if trust funds are depleted, they are not usually
replenished by subsequent deposits of the trustee's personal funds or funds from a third
party. See, e.g., Tooele County Bd. of Educ. v. Hadlock, 79 Utah 478, 11 P.2d 320, 32425 (1932). So, for example, if a trustee mixes $50 of trust money and $50 of his own
money in an account, and then writes a $50 check for dinner, the law presumes (under the

first presumption) that he has spent his own money, and the $50 remaining in the account
is subject to the trust. But if the trustee writes another $10 check for dessert, the extra
$10 must come from the trust funds, because once the first $50 has been spent, the only
money left is trust money. Thus, under this situation, the trust fund is reduced to $40. If
the trustee then gets another $60 from an outside source, and deposits that into the account, that deposit would not replenish the trust money (under the second presumption),
so the trust would still be limited to $40. The trust is thus limited to the "lowest intermediate balance" between the time of the commingling and the time the funds are
recovered or paid, i.e., $40. Volvo Finance believes that Wells Fargo would agree so far.
Wells Fargofs motion raised the issue of how to treat retentive transfers. That is, if
the trustee transfers money from one account to another, and then spends the money remaining in the first account, are the funds in the second account trust money or personal
funds? Wells Fargo contends that the first LIBR presumption (expenditures are deemed
to be taken from non-trust money first) should be applied every time funds are taken from
an account, even if the funds are not spent or otherwise dissipated. Under Wells Fargofs
view, a withdrawal of funds must be treated the same as an expenditure of funds, even if
the trustee actually maintains complete control over the funds. Thus, Wells Fargo contends that the December 21-22 transfers included all non-proceeds then in the
Concentration Account.
According to the authorities that have actually addressed this issue, however, the
first LIBR presumption applies only when funds are dissipated. If a trustee or debtor
does not dissipate funds withdrawn from a commingled account, but instead maintains

possession of the funds or their product (in cash, in another account, or by investing in
other assets), the withdrawal does not defeat the beneficiary's or creditor's interest. Thus,
when the $2 million was transferred on December 21 and 22 and kept in the First Security Account, while the Concentration Account was immediately dissipated, the transferred funds kept their status as "proceeds" of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles and remained
subject to Volvo Finance's security interest.
3.

The Law: Under LIBR, Volvo Finance's security interest remained
in the funds transferred from the Concentration Account to the First
Security Account.
a.

Cases and other authorities recognize that the first
presumption of LIBR does not apply unless funds are
dissipated.

Utah law has long recognized that where trust funds are converted into another
form of property, the trust extends to that property, and to all proceeds of that property,
even if the trust funds were commingled with the trustee's own money:
"The doctrine of equity, as regards property disposed of by persons in a
fiduciary position, is that, whether the disposition of it be rightful or
wrongful, the beneficial owner is entitled to the proceeds, whatever be
their form, provided only he can identify them. If they cannot be
identified, by reason of the trust money being mingled with that of the
trustee, then the cestui que trust is entitled to a charge upon the new
investment to the extent of the trust money traceable into it; that there is
no distinction between an express trustee and an agent, or bailee, or
collector of rents, or anybody else in a fiduciary position; and that there is
no difference between investments in the purchase of lands, or chattels, or
bonds, or loans, or moneys deposited in a bank account."
Waddell v. Waddell 36 Utah 435, 104 P. 743, 749 (1909) (emphasis added) (quoting
National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 54, 68 (1881)). Thus, the court in Waddell
held that the claimant's interest included not only funds that the defendant wrongfully

obtained from a decedent's estate, but also property the defendant purchased from a
commingled account. Id. at 750.
Courts therefore have long recognized that where a trustee (1) commingles trust
funds and personal funds in an account; (2) transfers some of those funds to another
account or form; and then (3) dissipates the funds left in the first account, the transferred
funds remain impressed with the trust. For example, more than one hundred years ago,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the plaintiff had a right to trace its funds to
certain warrants a bank had purchased out of a commingled account, even though the
bank subsequently depleted that account. See City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 90 N.W. 905
(Neb. 1902) (Add. Ex. 7). In Lincoln, about a week after the plaintiff city purchased a
certificate of deposit from the bank, the bank used $1,750 in cash to purchase certain
"state warrants." Eight months after that, the bank suspended operations.

When it

suspended operations, the bank had depleted its cash, but the receiver recovered $3,300
from selling the warrants. Id. at 906.
The court rejected the receiver's argument, identical to Wells Fargo's, that the
funds used to buy the warrants should be presumed to be the bank's own money, because
those funds were the first "withdrawn" from the commingled account. Instead, the court
held that the first presumption of LIBR applies only to funds that are dissipated:
The receiver contends that since there was over $40,000 in cash in the bank
at the time, of which but $6,000 belonged to the city, it will be presumed
that the $1,750 [withdrawn to purchase the warrants] was the bank's own
money. Such would be the case, without doubt, had the bank withdrawn
the money and dissipated it in some fashion. But it did not do this. It
merely changed the form of a portion of the fund in which the city's
money had been wrongfully mixed.

Id. at 909 (emphasis added). Because the funds were not dissipated, but were instead
used to buy the warrants, the city had a claim to the $3,300 generated by selling the
warrants, in preference to the bank's general creditors:
In accordance with the presumption that whatever was retained and not
dissipated was the city's money, and not the bank's, these warrants and
their proceeds in the hands of the receiver represent money to which the
city has a prior claim, and in which general creditors have no right to share.
Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Brennan v. Tillinghast 201 F. 609 (6th Cir. 1913) (Add. Ex. 8), the
Ironwood Bank wrongfully sold the plaintiffs stock and deposited the $3,500 in proceeds
in that bank's own account with a second bank, the Duluth Bank. Over the ensuing seven
days, the Ironwood Bank withdrew $2,800 from the Duluth account and put the cash into
its own vault.10 Throughout this time, the Duluth account always contained more than
$3,500. A few days later, the Duluth account was fully depleted, and the Ironwood Bank
soon closed. Cash remained in the Ironwood Bank's vault, however, and the plaintiff
asserted a right to have the wrongfully sold stock proceeds repaid out of that cash. Id. at
611-12.
Once again, as Wells Fargo does in the present case, the bank's receiver argued
that the plaintiff could not trace his funds from the Duluth account to the bank's vault,
because as the first money taken out of the Duluth account, the $2,800 transferred to the
vault was presumed to be the bank's own money, not the plaintiffs. Under the receiver's

The transfer was actually made through the use of cash drafts.

theory, the plaintiffs funds remained in the Duluth account after the transfers were
complete and were therefore lost when that account was depleted. Id. at 612-13.
The court, just like in Lincoln, acknowledged the presumption that "the sums first
drawn out were from the moneys which the tort-feasor had a right to expend in his own
business, and that the balance which remained included the trust fund, which he had no
right to use." Id. at 614. But as in Lincoln, the court concluded that "this rule of
presumption has no application where the evidence shows that the first moneys drawn out
of the mingled fund by the tort-feasor were not in fact dissipated by him at all, but were
merely transferred, in a substituted form, to another fund retained in his own
possession" IcL (emphasis added). Instead, the court held that the plaintiff could trace
his funds into the bank's remaining cash: "[T]he right to follow the trust in such form is
not lost by reason of the fact that the tort-feasor thereafter draws out and spends for his
own purposes the balance of the fund in which the trust money was originally mingled."
Id
The Brennan court (and many others) relied heavily on a seminal 1903 English
case, In re Oatway, 2 Ch. Div. 356 (Add. Ex. 9). In Oatway, the decedent had wrongfully
used funds from a commingled account to purchase stock and then dissipated the rest of
the account. Again, as in the present case, if the funds taken from the account were
deemed the decedent's personal funds (as Wells Fargo claims here), so that the claimant's
funds stayed in the account and were later dissipated, the trust would be extinguished and
the claimant left with a personal unsecured claim against the decedent's estate. But if the
funds taken from the account were deemed trust funds (as Volvo Finance maintains), the

claimant would be able to trace the funds to the stock and to the proceeds of their sale.
The court ruled in favor of the claimant, reasoning that "when any of the money drawn
out has been invested, and the investment remains in the name or under the control of the
trustee, the rest of the balance having afterwards been dissipated by him, he cannot
maintain that the investment which remains represents his own money alone, and that
what has been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered was the money
belonging to the trust." Id. at 360 (emphasis added).11
The principles established by these cases are recognized as controlling.

For

example, the Restatement of Restitution explains that where a wrongdoer "makes
withdrawals from the [commingled] bank account which are preserved or can be traced,
and subsequently withdraws and dissipates the balance of the deposit, the claimant can
enforce an equitable lien on the part withdrawn or its product."

Restatement of

Restitution § 211, cmt. c, at 852 (1937) (emphasis added). Applying this principle to the
lowest intermediate balance rule, section 212 of the Restatement of Restitution states that

11

Several other courts have recognized that the first presumption of LIBR does not
apply when funds are transferred or otherwise not dissipated. See, e.g., In re Pacat Fin.
Corp., 27 F.2d 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1928) (the "applicable principle" is set forth in Oatwav;
also citing Brennan and Lincoln); Mitchell v. Dunn, 294 P. 386, 389 (Cal. 1931) ("The
law will not permit the trustee to say that the only permanent investment made with
moneys from the fund was with personal funds, and that the dissipated funds belonged to
the cestui."); Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375, 377-78 (9th Cir.
1935) (following Brennan and Oatwav); In re Erie Trust Co., 191 A. 613, 617-18 (Pa.
1937) (following Oatway and Restatement of Trusts § 202(1)); Central Prod. Credit Assfn
v. Hans, 545 N.E.2d 1063, 1073-74 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (recognizing under Restatement
of Restitution § 212, cmt. d, that LIBR does not apply "where the money withdrawn or
traceable proceeds of that money are redeposited"); In re Goldberg, 168 B.R. 382, 385
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he presumption will not be applied to the disadvantage of the
beneficiary.").

a trust fund is depleted only when a person "makes withdrawals from the mingled fund
and dissipates the money so withdrawn." Id. § 212 (emphasis added) (Add. Ex. 10). A
comment to section 212 further explains that the rule "is not applicable where the money
withdrawn or traceable proceeds of that money are redeposited. If the money withdrawn
from the account is subsequently redeposited in the account, the effect is the same as
though the withdrawal had not been made, and the claimant's lien is not limited to the
lowest intermediate balance." Id § 212, cmt. d (emphasis added). See also Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 202 (1959); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 928 (Rev. 2d
ed. 1982) (discussing cases following Oatway); Austin W. Scott, The Right to Follow
Money Wrongfully Mingled With Other Money, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125(1913).
Given the foregoing, the trial court clearly erred in stating that there was f,no
authority'1 for Volvo Finance's position. (Order, Add. Ex. 1, at R. 2213.) To the
contrary, Lincoln, Brennan, Oatway, the Restatement of Trusts, the Restatement of
Restitution, Bogert's treatise, the Harvard Law Review, and the other cases cited above
certainly constitute "authority" that transactions that dissipate funds are treated differently
from transactions that preserve funds.

As such, Volvo Finance is not seeking to

"eliminate the rules for tracing." (Cf. id.) Volvo Finance is merely asking that the
tracing rules be applied just as they have been for more than a century.
b.

Adopting Wells Fargo's view would defeat the very
purpose of the tracing rules.

The Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule is supported by the very considerations that led
to the development of tracing rules in the first place. The presumption that withdrawals

are deemed to include non-trust funds first is based on a legal fiction that a trustee is
presumed to act properly; if a trustee withdraws and spends part of a commingled fund
and preserves the rest, the law presumes to the greatest extent possible that the trustee
was spending his own money and preserving the beneficiary's. See, e.g., Hadlock, 11
P.2d at 325 ('The presumption is that men act honestly; that when a trustee mingles trust
money with his own, and then draws out sums from a common fund by check or
otherwise, it will be presumed that he drew out his own in preference to the trust
money."). But where a trustee simply transfers one part of a commingled fund into a new
account, and then spends the money left remaining in the first account, application of the
"trustee acts properly" presumption supports the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule. If the
law presumes that the trustee preserves trust funds to the greatest extent possible, then the
law must presume that the trust funds were transferred to and preserved in the new
account.
Similarly, the purpose of LIBR is to protect the beneficiary's rights to the funds to
the greatest extent possible. See, e.g., CO. Funk & Sons v. Sullivan Equip., 431 N.E.2d
370, 372 (111. 1982) ("[T]he lowest-intermediate-balance rule directs that Funk's proceeds
in Sullivan's account are preserved to the greatest extent possible as the account is
depleted."). Indeed, that is the point of the presumption that the trustee spends his own
money first: Doing so presumes that the trust money is spent last, i.e., as little as
possible. But again, where some funds are transferred to a new account and the rest
spent, the purposes of LIBR are best achieved by applying the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway

rule, i.e., by presuming that the funds transferred to the new account are subject to the
trust.
C-

Wells Fargofs position is unsupported by law or logic.

Wells Fargo cited no authority below expanding LIBR to cover retentive transfers.
Instead, Wells Fargo relied primarily on a Utah bankruptcy case stating, without analysis,
that the first funds "removed" from an account are treated as non-trust funds under LIBR.
(See R. 883 (citing In re JD Serv., Inc., 284 B.R. 292, 298 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002).) Wells
Fargo also cited two additional bankruptcy cases repeating the general proposition that
when a commingled fund is "dissipated," the trust fund is also dissipated. (See id. (citing
Schuyler v. LittlefiekL 232 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1914); Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.,
817 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1987).) Finally, Wells Fargo cited two old Utah cases for
the proposition that if a claimant cannot trace the funds at issue, then the claimant loses
its special rights to those funds. (R. 832-33 (citing Kent v. Kent, 50 Utah 44, 165 P. 271,
272 (Utah 1917); Hadlock, 11 P.2d at 324-25).)
These cases are inapplicable because they do not deal with the situation presented
here, where the funds were transferred between accounts held by the trustee/debtor. In
fact, those cases actually support Volvo Finance's position. For example, in Hadlock, the
court allowed the plaintiff to trace funds into two separate accounts simultaneously, the
insolvent bank's own vault and that bank's account with a larger bank. See Hadlock, 11
P.2d at 325-26. The court also recognized that when the trustee is insolvent, "[t]here is a
presumption ... that what remains at the time of insolvency is a trust fund. The law
presumes that trust funds were not appropriated and that a balance of cash in the hands

of the depositary is the trust funds" Id. at 325 (emphasis added, internal quotation and
citation omitted). Similarly, the In re JD Services bankruptcy court, allowed a bank that
had erroneously credited a large deposit to the debtor to trace the funds when they were
transferred to a new account. See In re JD Serv., 284 B.R. at 298-99.
Wells Fargo's position is illogical as well. There is no good reason why a
creditor's rights in funds held by a debtor should depend on which account the debtor
used to keep the funds. If a debtor commingles $50 of secured proceeds with $50 of its
own funds, transfers half of the money to a new account, and then writes a $50 check for
dinner, why should it matter if the check is drawn on the second account or on the first?
Under either scenario, the debtor still would have $50 of the funds remaining, traceable to
the commingled account, enough to satisfy the creditor's claim.
Wells Fargo asks this Court to exalt form over substance by treating funds held in
two accounts differently from funds held in a single account and by holding that a
secured creditor's ability to trace depends on whether the debtor had kept the funds in the
same account, transferred funds between accounts and back, or withdrawn the funds and
redeposited them. Indeed, as Mr. Judd pointed out in his deposition, Wells Fargo's
preferred approach would allow a debtor to destroy a security interest simply by
transferring funds from one account to another and back.

(See R. 836.)

The

Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule ignores such trivialities and instead focuses on the
substantive question of whether the debtor maintained control of the funds or their
product.

d.

Summary.

The cases, the restatements, and the other authorities agree: Under LIBR, when
trust funds are placed into a commingled account, and when funds from that account are
withdrawn but retained, with the account then being depleted, the beneficiary or creditor
does not lose his interest in the trust funds still in the trustee's possession. Thus, as a
matter of law, when Great Basin transferred $2 million from the Concentration Account
to the First Security Account, and then spent the rest of the money in the Concentration
Account, Volvo Finance's security interest in the funds was not defeated; instead, that
security interest continued in the funds as they remained in the First Security Account.
As such, the trial court erred in concluding that the funds transferred back to the
Concentration Account on December 29 did not include proceeds traceable to the sale of
any of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. The Judgment should therefore be reversed.
B.

The alternative grounds Wells Fargo raised below would not support
summary judgment against Volvo Finance.
Because the trial court ruled that the transfer between Great Basin accounts

defeated Volvo Finance's claim to the funds at issue, the court did not address the two
alternative grounds Wells Fargo raised in support of its motion for summary judgment.
The first alternative ground Wells Fargo raised was that under Revised Article 9, Volvo
Finance is required to prove "collusion" between Wells Fargo and Great Basin in order to
prevail. The second ground is that even if the pre-revised Article 9 governs, Volvo
Finance's claim is barred by the "ordinary course" defense that is mentioned in a

comment to former UCC 9-306(2), Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2). Both arguments
should be rejected.
1.

Revised Article 9 does not apply because it was not in effect in
December 2000.

First, Revised Article 9, which placed additional requirements on a secured
creditor in order to maintain priority against a bank, does not apply to the present case.
Revised Article 9, by its own terms, did not go into effect until July 1, 2001, and the
conversion at issue here happened in December 2000. Revised Article 9 expressly states
that it does not affect relative priorities that were established prior to July 2001:
This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral.
However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established before
this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority,
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l) (emphasis added). This statute "serves as a grandfather
clause, protecting interests that enjoyed priority under former Article 9 but would lose
that status under the revised provisions. It ensures that 'the mere taking effect of [revised
Article 9] does not of itself adversely affect the priority of conflicting claims to
collateral."1 Interbusiness Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Mifflintown, 318 F. Supp. 2d 230,
238 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (emphasis added, bracketed material in original, citations omitted).

Revised Article 9 requires a creditor to obtain "control" over a debtor's bank
account to preserve its priority over a setting-off bank: "The exercise by a bank of a setoff against a deposit account is ineffective against a secured party that holds a security
interest in the deposit account which is perfected by control under Subsection 70A-9104(l)(c), if the set-off is based on a claim against the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 70A9a-340(3) (emphasis added). A secured creditor may obtain "control" of a deposit
account by entering into an agreement with the bank or by "becoming] the bank's customer with respect to the deposit account." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-104(l)(a), (b).
The control requirement did not exist under former Article 9.

In Interbusiness Bank, the court held that former Article 9 governed a priority dispute
between creditors whose interests were perfected in February and May 2001,
respectively, even though the lawsuit was not filed until 2003 and involved a liquidation
that occurred after the Revised Article took effect. See id, at 239-40. Here, whatever
rights Wells Fargo and Volvo Finance had in Great Basin's funds were established on
December 29, 2000, the day Wells Fargo seized the funds from Great Basin's account.
Therefore, former Article 9 controls.
In Utah, statutes do not operate retroactively; instead, the law in effect at the time
of the events in question governs liability for those events.

See, e.g., WebBank v.

American Gen'l Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, % 5 n.3, 54 P.3d 1139. Indeed,
retroactively applying Revised Article 9 in this situation would be especially unfair to
Volvo Finance and other creditors. As mentioned in footnote 12 above, Revised Article 9
instituted new procedures for a creditor to maintain control over debtor's use of proceeds,
e.g., by obtaining "control" over a deposit account. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a104(1). But Revised Article 9 gave creditors until July 1, 2001, to take such steps. It
would be unfair to hold Volvo Finance to the new requirements of the Revised Article 9
before that article even went into effect.
2.

Summary judgment cannot be justified by the purported "ordinary
course" defense of Comment 2(c).

Wells Fargo's second alternative ground below was that the so-called "ordinary
course" defense, which appears in a comment to former UCC 9-306, allows Wells Fargo
to take the proceeds of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles free and clear of Volvo Finance's

undisputed superior security interest.

(Volvo Finance's motion for partial summary

judgment also raised the same issue, asking the trial court to strike two "ordinary course11
affirmative defenses.)
As noted above, former UCC 9-306(2) states that a security interest in collateral
"continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by a debtor." Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) (2000) (Add. Ex. 4). Comment 2(c) to former UCC 9-306
states as follows:
Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking account and
paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds of
course take free of any claim which the secured party may have in them as
proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and transfers in ordinary
course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no doubt in appropriate
cases support recovery of proceeds by a secured party from a transferee out
of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the debtor to defraud the
secured party.
Former UCC 9-306, cmt. 2(c). Relying primarily on three out-of-state cases,13 Wells
Fargo argued that under the ordinary course defense, Volvo Finance would have to prove
either that Wells Fargo knew, or that Wells Fargo recklessly disregarded, that Great
Basin's "payment" of the proceeds to Wells Fargo violated Volvo Finance's security
interest.

Wells Fargo insisted that because Wells Fargo seized the funds from the

Concentration Account without knowing that Volvo Finance had an interest in those
funds, Volvo Finance's claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.

u

Textron Fin. Corp. v. Firstar Bank Wis., 579 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998);
J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993); HarleyDavidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1990).

The ordinary course defense must be rejected for two reasons. First, the defense
does not even apply in Utah in this kind of case. Second, even if the defense could apply,
Wells Fargo has not established that the defense does apply.
a.

The ordinary course defense as a matter of law cannot
apply to the present facts.
(i)

Utah law precludes the defense.

First, a defense based on a "comment" simply cannot trump the plain language of
the UCC statutes. As noted above, UCC 9-306(2), which was enacted by the Utah
legislature, plainly states that a security interest in collateral includes identifiable
proceeds of that collateral. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2). Adopting the ordinary
course defense would enable a comment to take precedence over the plain language of a
statute. This would not be appropriate.
Second, this case is controlled by Insley, and the principles behind the ordinary
course defense are inconsistent with those expressed in Insley. 717 P.2d 1341 (Add. Ex.
5). As discussed earlier, Insley held that when a debtor deposits funds into an overdrawn
account, and the bank uses those funds to repay itself for an overdraft advance, the bank
is liable for conversion if the funds were proceeds in which a creditor had a perfected
security interest. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he purpose and concept of
notice filing would be significantly weakened if we held that [a bank] is not bound by
that which it would have discovered through a proper inquiry." Id at 1345. The court
further explained that one of the purposes of Article 9 "is to relieve creditors from the
age-old requirement of policing collateral in the hands of a debtor. Adoption of the

minority approach [allowing a bank to take priority] places such a duty on creditors and
'would severely undercut significant values of certainty, efficiency, and reliance which
are at the heart of the Codal emphasis on public filing.'" Id. at 1346 (citation omitted).
Instead, "[a] secured party should be able to rely on his compliance with the Code's
requirements for perfection and his search of the record as against an unrecorded
interest of a setting-off bank." Id. (emphasis added).
To allow an "ordinary course" defense on the facts of this case, i.e., to require
Volvo Finance to establish knowledge or recklessness by Wells Fargo, the Court would
have to conclude that Volvo Finance's UCC-1 filings were not enough to put Wells Fargo
on notice of Volvo Finance's interest in the proceeds of the Vehicles, and that Volvo
Finance was required to take additional steps, beyond the filing, to protect its rights.
Insley precludes such reasoning. Indeed, under Wells Fargo's view, the only way a
secured creditor could protect its interest would be to physically prevent delivery of
inventory until payment was received. But once again, imposing such a requirement
would contradict the Utah Supreme Court's recognition in Insley that the purpose of Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-9-205 is to relieve creditors of the "age-old requirement of policing
collateral in the hands of a debtor." Insley, 717 P.2d at 1346. Volvo Finance respectfully
submits that there is no way the Court can adopt the "ordinary course" defense and still
remain faithful to Insley.14

14

Perhaps recognizing this problem, Wells Fargo attempted below to distinguish
Insley by denying that Wells Fargo exercised a "setoff." (R. 2164-66.) But the use of the
deposited funds to offset the prior "negative balance" is the very epitome of a setoff, and
any attempt to distinguish Insley would be futile.

Finally, the only Utah Supreme Court case discussing the ordinary course defense,
while not directly on point, appears to bar any attempt to apply the ordinary course
defense in this case. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Int'L 2000 UT 92, 17 P.3d 1100.
In Simplot a vendor sold the debtor's crops but used the proceeds to pay itself for
commissions and other expenses. The debtor's financer, who had a superior security
interest in the crops and proceeds, sued for conversion. Among other things, the vendor
claimed a right to the proceeds under the "ordinary course" defense of Comment 2(c). Id
fflf 39-42. The court noted that Comment 2(c) had never been adopted in Utah, and that it
did not need to consider whether to adopt Comment 2(c) because that comment simply
did not apply. Id, 140. The Simplot court relied on the fact that the debtor in that case
did not exercise control over the funds at issue; rather, the vendor received the funds from
the crop sales and paid those funds to itself. IcL ^ 42. That fact distinguishes Simplot
from the present case. The rest of the court's reasoning is instructive, however:
This situation more closely resembles a conflict between a perfected
security interest and a right of setoff See Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper
Bank & Trust 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986) (ruling that perfected
security interest prevails over a right of setoff); First Sec. Bank of Utah v.
Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329, 334 (Utah 1980) (holding that
setoff was improper). Therefore, Comment 2(c) is inapplicable and the
district court did not err in rejecting this argument as a matter of law.
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, because that case "closely resemble[d]" a conflict
between a perfected security interest and a setoff, the ordinary course defense did not
apply. The present case, of course, is a conflict between Volvo Finance's perfected
security interest and Wells Fargo's setoff. Thus, the ordinary course defense cannot apply
here, either.

(ii)

Even if Utah law were silent, the weight
of out-of-state authority rejects the defense in cases such as this.

Even if Insley did not control, it would still be erroneous for the Court to allow
Wells Fargo to escape liability for its conversion of Volvo Finance's collateral under the
"ordinary course" defense of Comment 2(c). In cases involving setoffs to repay overdraft
advances, courts reject the ordinary course defense. See Bank of Brewton v. GMAC, 811
F. Supp. 648, 650-51 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (ordinary course defense not shown because "[t]he
Bank admits that it did not do a UCC search that would have turned up GMAC's prior
lien"); C & H Farm Serv., 449 N.W.2d at 876-77 (rejecting defense because "the bank's
payment of Schellhorns' overdrafts constituted unsecured loans from the bank to
Schellhorns" and "the bank may not loan money to Schellhorns by paying Schellhorns'
overdrafts and then expect to 'jump over' C & H's priority in identifiable proceeds of C &
H's collateral"); GMAC v. Lincoln Nat'l 18 S.W.3d at 339-40 (ordinary course defense
"does not apply when a bank seizes funds deposited in a customer's account and applies
such funds to payment of overdrafts or antecedent debts. Such an interpretation would
eviscerate the security interest in proceeds of collateral contrary to [9-306(2)] and
permit a bank that had made an unsecured loan to leapfrog secured creditors")
(emphasis added). Even if Insley did not govern, these cases would control.
It is perfectly appropriate to expect a bank — like any other creditor - to check a
customer's UCC filings when the bank decides to loan a customer money, as in the
present case and in Bank of Brewton, C & H Farm Service, and GMAC v. Lincoln
National. Indeed, by pursuing its "ordinary course" defense, Wells Fargo claims a right

to loan money to an already overextended customer, without no investigation into the
customer's creditworthiness, and then to be protected from its own bad decisions by
jumping ahead of secured creditors and taking repayment from proceeds already pledged
away. And to make matters worse, by pursuing a defense based on its lack of "actual
knowledge," Wells Fargo has claimed special rights because of its own failure to
investigate Great Basin's condition. Allowing this would frustrate the purpose of the
UCC's filing system. Therefore, even without Insley and Simplot, Wells Fargo's ordinary
course defense would fail as a matter of law.
b.

Even if an ordinary course defense could apply. Great
Basin has not, as a matter of law, satisfied the
requirements for that defense.

Finally, even if an ordinary course defense could somehow apply to the present
situation, Wells Fargo did not establish as a matter of law that the defense does apply
based on the undisputed facts.15 Addressing this issue would require the Court to review

First, Comment 2(c) refers to funds "paid out" of a checking account, and that is
not what happened here; Wells Fargo simply set off the deposited funds against the prior
overdrafts. Second, the application of the ordinary course defense is a question of fact.
See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, 897 F.2d at 622-23; HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley
Bank & Trust, 712 N.E.2d 952, 958 (Ind. 1999). In HCC Credit, the court held that the
"ordinary course" defense depends on "(1) the extent to which the payment was made in
the routine operation of the debtors business, and (2) the extent to which the recipient
was aware that it was acting to the prejudice of the secured party." 712 N.E.2d at 956-57.
The court held that the debtor's payment to the bank was not in the ordinary course
because the bank was aware that the plaintiff had a perfected security interest in the
debtor's tractor inventory, and the payment was unusually large. See id, at 959. It is
Volvo Finance's position that Wells Fargo failed to establish as a matter of law that Great
Basin's "payment" to Wells Fargo was made in the "routine operation" of Great Basin's
business. Nor did Wells Fargo establish that it was not aware it was acting to Volvo
Finance's prejudice in seizing Great Basin's funds on December 29. Indeed, as explained
in the Statement of Facts, even apart from Volvo Finance's UCC filing, Great Basin had

the record in detail, however, when the trial court itself has not yet done so on this issue
(or, if it has, the results of its review did not appear in the Order). Volvo Finance
respectfully submits that, for the reasons set forth above, this Court should rule that the
ordinary course defense cannot apply to the present situation, i.e., where a bank exercises
a setoff to the prejudice of a secured creditor. However, if this Court concludes that Utah
law allows Wells Fargo to rely on the ordinary course defense, then Volvo Finance
submits that the best approach would be to remand to the trial court to apply that defense.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, Great Basin did not defeat Volvo Finance's security interest in
the proceeds of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles by transferring $2 million to the First
Security Account on December 21 and 22 and depleting the rest of the funds in the
Concentration Account.

Further, Revised Article 9 cannot be applied to bar Volvo

Finance's claim, as that statute was not in effect when Wells Fargo converted the funds at
issue. Finally, the ordinary course defense should be rejected as a matter of law, because
allowing Wells Fargo to escape liability due to its own claimed ignorance of Volvo
Finance's interest would flatly contradict the unambiguous holdings in Insley, Simplot,
and the out-of-state cases dealing with overdraft advances. Volvo Finance therefore
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order granting summary
judgment to Wells Fargo and remand the matter for further proceedings.

actual knowledge that Volvo Finance likely had a security interest in Great Basin's
inventory and proceeds, and that the funds Great Basin would be transferring to Wells
Fargo would likely include such proceeds. (See R. 1004-05.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VOLVO COMMERCIAL FINANCE LLC
THE AMERICAS, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
on
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a national
banking association

CIVIL NO. 020905207

Defendant.

JUDGE LA. DEVER

This matter came before the Court on cross motions for Summary Judgment.
The Court heard argument and has reviewed the memoranda and documents submitted
by the parties.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. Volvo Finance LLC The Americas (Volvo) financed the purchase of Volvo
vehicles by Great Basin Truck Company.
2. Volvo took a security interest in those trucks.
3. In the fall of 2000, Great Basin began to experience financial difficulties.
4. Great Basin maintained a series of operating accounts with Wells Fargo Bank.

5. The funds deposited with Wells Fargo were a combination of trust funds (from
the sale of trucks), and non-trust funds (income from other sources).
6. On or about December 26 through December 29, 2000, Great Basin had
overdrafts in the Wells Fargo account in the amounts of $281,056 and $828,951.
7. On December 27, 2000, Great Basin transferred $300,000 to the Wells Fargo
account from a First Security Bank account. On December 29, 2000, Great Basin
transferred $900,000 to the Wells Fargo account from the same First Security account.
8. The sums of money in the Wells Fargo and First Security accounts and the
amount of transfers between those accounts are not in dispute.

CLAIM
Volvo claims that a portion of the $900,000 transferred into the Wells Fargo
account on December 29th was directly traceable to trust funds received for the sale of
trucks and therefore belongs to Volvo.

DISPUTED ISSUES
There are no material facts in dispute. The issues before the Court deal with a
legal interpretation of three issues:
1. Under the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR) can Volvo trace
any of the monies received by Wells Fargo on December 29th.
2. Does revised Section 70A-9a-322 require dismissal of the claims

asserted by Volvo.
3. If revised §322 does not apply, does Comment 2 (c) of the former §322
dictate dismissal of the claim made by Volvo.
For the reason stated below, the Court need not address issues 2 and 3.

BASIC LAW
The rules for the tracing of monies in a commingled trust/non-trust account are
not in dispute and have not been in dispute for generations. The two basic rules that
apply are
1. When monies are withdrawn from a commingled account, they are
deemed to come first from non-trust funds. Only when insufficient non-trust funds exist
are the trust funds invaded.
2. Once trust proceeds are removed from the account, they are presumed
not to be replenished by subsequent deposits of non-denominated monies.

ANALYSIS
As previously noted, there is no dispute as to the amount of money in the Wells
Fargo account and the transfers or amounts from it to First Security and back. The
dispute centers on the character of the transfers of $1.5 million on December 21 st and
$500,000 on December 22nd.
Both parties agree that at the start of December 21 st there was $1.6+ million of

trust funds and $1.2+ million of non-trust funds in the Wells Fargo account. Non-trust
monies were received and spent, reducing the non-trust portion to $933,415.65. Also
occurring on this day was a transfer of $1.5 million to First Security Bank. It is the
character of this sum that is in dispute. Volvo claim the entire $1.5 million should come
from the trust portion of the account. Wells Fargo claims that LIBR rules require that
$933,415.65 comes from non-trust and the remainder ($566,584.35) comes from the
trust portion. Volvo argues that the "transfer" of funds versus the spending of funds
should be treated differently. The Court disagrees that there is or should be a
difference in the treatment of the funds based upon spending versus transferring. The
difference, if one exists, is in the manner of the characterization of the removal. Volvo
argues that since the funds were being transferred all of the transferred monies should
come from the trust portion. The problem with this view is that there is no authority for
such a position. To eliminate the rules for tracing based upon a view of how the money
is allegedly disbursed, transfer versus payment, would undermine the rule.
The better reasoned approach is to follow the rule. There was available, on
December 21 st , non-trust monies of $933,415.65. Therefore, the first $933,415.65 paid
to First Security were these non-trust funds. The remaining amount of $566,584.35 was
from trust funds. First Security had non-trust funds in excess of $900,000 when that
amount was transferred to Wells Fargo on December 29, 2000.

Volvo's claim that $693,132 was traceable trust funds is without merit. Summary
Judgment for Wells Fargo is granted.
Dated this 11th day of November, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the H

day of November, 2005,1 mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage prepaid, to the following:

James S. Jardine
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385

Stephen P. Horvat
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Ste 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Exhibit 1
icks FSB Activity for December 2000

13,372

11,406

27.194

63.433

49,928

33,172

(91)

18,896

15,438

18,819

29,099

36,632

9,180

31,230

13,321

72,406

8,858

1,789
(1,5
(208.081)

300,000
318,956
(232.734)

613,933
(333.289)

134,787
(339.909)

16,450
(531.174)

1,011,385
(68.961)

2,500
(406,641)

$ 597.043 $2.270.574

$2,349,774

$1,991,200

$2,989,075

$1,125,001

653
(78,035) (1.014,735)
$ 661.274

354,348
(1.172,310)

206,868

$ 900,00(
Transfe

696
(125,055)

(38,915)

$ (281.056) $ (790,161) $ (828,951) $

(53.310)

IN TRUCKS - FIRST SECURITY BANK (222-00085-32)

50,904
50,904

455,252
2,247,171

585,936
2,377,856

286,236
2,110,786

405,453
2,230,002 $3,014,3*

208,081
(300,000)

$

(900,000)

50,904

196,267

130,685

300

119,217

50,904

$2,247,171

$2,377,856

$2,110,786

$2,230,002

63,132
(261,717)
$3,014,385

Tab 3

Page 1 of 8
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
PO BOX 63020
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94163

Account No:

409-8328487

Statement Start Date:
Statement End Date:

12/01/00
12/31/00

GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACCT
2300 S 4000 W
WEST VALLEY UT 84120

For Customer Assistance:
Call your Customer Service Officer or Client Services
1-800-AT WELLS (289-3557)
5:00 AM to 6:00 PM Pacific Time Monday - Friday

Account Number

Beginning Balance

Ending Balance

483,775 .54

- 53,310.05

WellsOne Account
409-8328487
Credits
Electronic Deposits/ Bank Credits
Effective
Date

Posted
Date
Dec 01

Amount
1,405.83

Dec 01

124,168.79

Dec 01

19,495.54

Dec 01

117,688.40

Dec 01

456,226,97

Dec 01

39,456.15

Dec 01

16,153.47

Dec 01

92,091.56

Dec 01

344.45

Dec 04

109,022.53

Dect04

212,966.43

Dec 04

184,858.08

Dec 04

17,314.79

Dec 04

91,481.57

Dec 04

65,938.00

Dec 04

87,692.84

Dec 05

4,882.51

Dec 05

7,139.49

Continued on next page

f~

Transaction Detail
Sweep Dividend Deposit ACH
Dividend Tra
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transf er
From 4098328602

EXHIBIT

1

1 ? _l
•

WFB2 017085

/ *ncL

Page 2 of 8
Account No:
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACCT

Statement End Date:

409-8328487
12/31/00

Electronic Deposits/ Bank Credits
Effective
Date

Posted
Date
Dec 05

Amount
64,549.8 6

Dec 05

431,012.77

Dec 05

19,988.77

pec 05

414,555.14

Dec 05

63,768.81

Dec 06

102,980.75

Dec 06

50,136.08

Dec 06

38,200.54

Dec 06

2,767.69

Dec 06

937.83

Dec 06

86,757.28

Dec 07
Dec 07

325,000.00
38,777.64

Dec 07

42,751.2 7

Dec 07

144,773.25

Dec 07

162,154.96

Dec 07

23.524.24

Dec 07

30.327.25

Dec 07

2,855.29

Dec 07

23,827.46

Dec 07
Dec 08

294,206.33
47,563.17

Dec 08

709.54

Dec 08

206,809.27

Dec ,08

18,696.07

Dec 08

149,761.68

Dec 08

5,868.88

Dec 08

208,783.60

Dec 08

68,194.53

Dec 11

25,000.00

Dec 11

76,596.34

Dec 11

5,271.16

Transaction* Detail
ZBA Funding Account Tr«
„..
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
Over The Counter Deposit
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
Sweep Transfer From Investment
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
Transfer From DDA #
000007483661471
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602

Continued on next page
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Account No:
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACOT
Electronic Deposits/ Haul
Effective
Date

Post:ed
Date
Dec 'll

Statement End D a t e .

Amount
224,933 .76
J rf - / ,

Dec 11

i;; , -nw

De c

n

3

9;

wC}- : =

51, 403 .97

Dec 12

57

Dec 12

71,47 3

Dec 12

59,419 . .

Di

1 ,'

-

' :

•

.•

48,313 .62

Dec 12

53,120.23

Dec 12

1/859.30

Dec 12

37,067.94

Dec 12

6,788.51

Dec 13

113,990.89

Dec 13

65,312.97

Dec 13

15,395.30

Dec 13

1,846.75

Dec 13

1,816

83

Dec 14

13,371

7G

Dec 14

11,405.97

Dec 14

89,734.36

Dec 14

257,048 ,88

Dec 14

55,920.19

Dec ,14 .
Dec 15

De-

HJ

Dec 15

12/11/00

^nciits

Dec 11

Dec 31

409-8328487

5,986,44
300,000

00

27,193.,54
1,130,b20,, 64

Dec 15

80;655,.79

Dec 15

192,552 .52

Transaction? Detail
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfei
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account J r a n s f er
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098327406
WT Fed#00126 Zions First
Nation /Org=great B a s i n G m c '
Trucks Inc Srf#
20001215095436Cp
Trn#001215022310 R f b #
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328529
SBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account Tx*ansfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account T r a n s f e r
From 4178529582

Continued on next page
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Account No:
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACCT

Statement End Date:

409-8328487
12/31/00

Electronic Deposits/ Bank Credits
Effective
Posted
Date
' Date
Dec 15

Amount
23,857.29

Dec 15

154,417.65

Dec 15

97,523.14

Dec 18

75,677.60

Dec 18

18,895.98

Dec 18

156,577.32

Dec 18

23,408.51

Dec. 18

33,171.54

Dec 18

111,378.39

Dec 18
Dec 19

176,087.56
15,437.77

Dec 19

31/229.89

Dec 19

109,481.66

Dec 19

15,591.64

Dec 19

858.58

Dec 20

18,818.69

Dec 20

863,133.80

Dec" 20

97,020.00

Dec 20

36,632.00

Dec 20

51,231.04

Dec 21

29/098.93

Dec 21

1,788.83

Dec 21

9/179.81

Dec 21

2,500.00

Dec "21
Dec 22

1,701,176.79
113,654.52

Dec 22

653.34

Dec 22
Dec 26

350,563.81
72,405.71

Dec 26
Dec 27

485,203.72
300,000.00

Transaction?Detai1
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
* ZBA Funding Account-Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
Sweep Transfer From investment
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602
ZBA 'Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488-.
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4911433407
* Z3A Funding Account Transfer
From 4098327406
Z3A Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328602
Z3A Funding Account Transfer"
From 4911433407
Z3A Funding Account Transfer
From 40983274X36
Sweep Transfer From Investment
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4496807488
Sweep Transfer From Investment
ZBA Funding Account transfer
From 4098328529
Sweep Transfer From Investment
W7 Fed#00435 Great Basin
Trucks /Org=:great Basin Trucks
Srf# 200012270828
• Trn#00l227026891 Rfb#
200012270828

Continued on next page
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Account No:
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACCT

409-832848:

Statement End Date:

E l e c t r o n i c D e p o s i t s / Banl<. i",t edit:,.
Effective
Date

Posted
Date
Dec 27

Amount
8,,857.. 67

Dec 27

352,,955 .32

Dec 27

1,,392.68

Dec 28

124 ,44

Dec 29

900,,000 00

•Dec 29
14,275,861 .94

14,275,861 .i:* 4

Transaction?Detail
ZBA 'Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328529
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
ZBA. Funding Account Transfer
From 4098328644
WT Fed#00654 Great Basin
Trucks /Org=great Basin Trucks
Srf# 20
'
.
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
From 4801908138
Total Electronic Depo; •< „,
Bank Credits
To t a 1 (.' r edit s

Debits
Electronic Debits/ Bank Debits
Effective
ate '

n

Posted
Date
Dec 01
Dec 04
Dec 05
Dec 05
Dec 06
Dec 06
Dec 0i.i
Dec 06
Dec 07
Dec 08
Dec 11
Dec 12

Dec 12
Dec 13

Dec 13
Dec 13

Transaction Detail
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4759611866
804,271 ..41 ZBA Funding Recount Transfer
To 4759611866
134,557.75
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4759611-866
121,678.14
Sweep Transfer To Investment
5,090.76
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4098328602
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
7,019,11
To 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
482,929.11
To 4759611866
Sweep Transfer To Investment
172,528.19
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
1,209,563.89
To 4759611866
221 , =570.07 ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4759611866
76i> . 206.L4 ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4759611866
325, 000 ,i.-r WT Fed#01704 .Zions First
Nation /Ftr/3nf=great 3asin
Trucks Srf# PC00121210025233
Trn#001212018679 Rfb=
003471001
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
13;.
To 4759611866
1 9 r.
WT Fed#05185 Zions First
Nation /Ftr/3nf«great 3asin
Trucks Srf# MS1213
Trn#001213037381* Rfb#
003481001
8,577 .89 'ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4098328602
10, 517., 72 ZBA Funding Account: Transfer
To 4178529582
Amount
941", 934.99

Continued on next page
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Account No:
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACCT

Statement End Date:

409-8328487
12/31/00

Electronic Debits/ Bank Debics
Effective
Date

Posted
Date
Dec 13
Dec 13
Dec 14
Dec 14
Dec 14
Dec 15
Dec 15
Dec 18
Dec 18
Dec 18
Dec 19
Dec 19
Dec 19
Dec 19
Dec 20
Dec 20
Dec 20
Dec 20
Dec 20
Dec 20
'Dec 20
Dec 20
Dec 20
Dec 21

Dec 21
Dec 21

Dec 21
Dec 22

Dec 22

Amount
289,592.13

Transaction Detail
ZBA Funding'Account Transfer
To 4759611866
1,055.41
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4098327406
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
344.60
To 4496807488
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
232,389.20
To 4759611866
76,689.54
Sweep Transfer.To Investment
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
333,289.48
To 4759611866
Sweep Transfer To # Investment
1,533,064.09
ZBA funding Account Transfer
30,069.65
To 4178529582
273.77
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4496807488
09,565.48
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4759611866
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
54,190.08
To 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
94,481.54
To 4759611866
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
82,501.88
To*4801908138
Sweep Transfer To Investment
44,781.04
Client Analysis Srvc Chrg •
1,888.06
001219 Svc Chge 1100
000004098328487
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
53.00
To 4098328560 •
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
2,027.79,
To 4098328602
21,354.92
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
• To 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
53.00
To 4098328685
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
215.53
To 4496807488 .
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
•53.00
To 4496807496
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
' 43,3.16.02
To 4759611866
Sweep Transfer To Investment
1,058,497.21
WT Fed#01596 First Security
1/500,000.00
Ban /Ftr/Bnf =great Basin
Trucks Srf# PC00122109164706
Trn#001221018216 Rfb#
003561001
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
1,59*5.78
To 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
403,642.20
To 4759611866
1,403.38
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
To 4801908138
500,000.00
WT Fed#04251 First Security.
Ban /Ftr/Bnf=great Basin
Trucks Srf# PC00122211554859
Trn#001222040221 Rfb#
003571001
ZBA Funding Account Transfer
845.94
To 4098328602

Continued on next page
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Account N o :

GREAT BASIN COMPANIES •
CONCENTRATION ACCT

Statement End Date:

4 09-8 3 2 84 3

12/3:.

Electronic Debits/ Bank: Debits
Effective
Date

Posted
Date
Dec 22

Amount
2,.690.52

Transaction Detail
ZBA Funding Account
To 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account
30..23 1.i9
To 4178529582
33,,91/.02
ZBA Funding Account
To 4759611866
350 "0
ZBA Funding Account
To 4801908138
I u
ZBA Funding Account
To 4911433407
, . / ZBA Funding Account
To 4098328644
153,,"'12.60
ZBA Funding Account
To 4178529582
ZBA Funding Account
77C ,,7*2 .16
To 4759611866
:"U !
ZBA Funding Account
To 4801908138
22 9 : if
ZBA Funding Account
To 4098327406
7,f I'. 2 J b
ZBA Funding Account
To 4098328602
23.r286.95
ZBA Funding Account
To'4098328644
*
*
r
p
n
1 14 I
ZBA Funding Account
To 4759611866 .
ZBA Funding Account
, .«.'••. 1 9
To 4098327406
5 , 2<Jb.77
ZBA Funding Account
To 4178529582
J T .. " V
ZBA Funding Account
To 4759611866
333.0b
ZBA Funding Account
To 480190.8138
.931.49
ZBA Funding Account
To 4098328644
ZBA Funding Account
To 4178529582
, ^f
4 r;
ZBA Funding Account
To 4759611866

Dec 22
Dec 22
Dec 22
Dec 22
Dec 26

(i.

Dec 26
• Dec 26
•Dec 26
Dec 26
Dec 27
Dec 27
Dec 27
Dec 27
Dec 28
Dec 28

£

Dec 28
Dec 29.
Dec 29
Dec 29

'„''"

transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer'
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer

Total Eiectroni c Debits/ Bank
Debits
^
Daily Ledger Balance
Date Nov
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec

30
01
04
05
06
07
08
11

7.53

Total

Debits

Summary
Balance
483, 775,.54
408, 871..71
373,.874,.54
1 ,123,,536,,00
737,,749,.00
616,,382,.80
1 ,099,,191..47
753 (,331 .85

Balance

Date

Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec

12
13
14
15
18
19
20
21

632,689.15
3'96,308.74
520,353.00
6 6 0 , 8 2 0 . 00
916,108. 00
512,753.00
4 5 2 , 1 3 0 . 00

289f 233, 00

Continued on next page
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Account No:
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES
CONCENTRATION ACCT

Statement End Date:

409-8328487
.

12/31/00

Daily Ledger Balance Summary
Date
Dec 22
Dec 26- '
Dec 21

Balance
176,070,00
-281,056.01
-790,160.73

Average Daily Ledger Balance

Thank you for banking with Wells Fargo.

Date
Dec 28
Dec 29

Balance
-828,951.36'
-53,310.05

402,428.39

Member FDIC

WFB2 017092
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LODE
CHAPTER (-» SECURED TRANSACTIONS — SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
PAJv I
VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO
[REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, ^001]
Copyright ©

19b3-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
70A-9-201
20011.

General validity of security agreement

|ht.pealed effective Jul

1,

Except as otherwise provided by this act a security agreement is effective
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates any charge or practice
illegal under any statute or regulation thereunder governing usury, small loans,
retail installment sales, or the like, or extends the application of any such
statute or regulation to any transaction not otherwise subject thereto.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, §

9-201.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.—Laws 2000, ch. 252, §
effective July 1, 2001.
Cross-References. —Variation by agreement, §

176 repeaLs this chapter

70A-1-102(3).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d. — 6 8 A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § §
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions §

160 et seq., 192 et seq.

n

A.L.H. —Liability for the statutory penalty of persons other than the offending
lender in a usurious loan transaction, 4 A.L.R.3d 650.
What is "compound interest" within meaning of statutes prohibit in<\ fh< charging
of such interest, 10 A.L.R.3d 421.
Usury as affected by mistake in amount of calculation of interest or service
charges for loan, 11 A.L.R.3d 1498.
U.C.A. 1953 §
UT ST §

70A-9-201

70A-9-201

END OF DOCUMENT

©

2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig, U.S. Govt. Works.

Wstta
UT ST § 70A-9-203
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9-203

Page 1

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
PART 2. VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO
[REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
Copyright ©

1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
70A-9-203 Attachment and enforceability of security interest —Proceeds —
requisites [Repealed effective July 1, 2001].

Formal

(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-4-208 on the security interest of a
collecting bank, Sections 70A-9-115 and 70A-9-116 on security interest in
investment property, and Section 70A-9-113 on a security interest arising under the
chapter on sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, the collateral is investment property and the secured party has control
pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains
a description of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest covers
crops growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the land
concerned;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor
tfith respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events
specified in Subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones
:he time of attaching.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed, a security agreement gives the secured party the
rights to proceeds provided by Section 70A-9-306.
(4) A transaction, although subject to this chapter, is also subject to the Utah
Iniform Consumer Credit Code, and in the case of conflict between the provisions of
.his chapter and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the provisions of the
atter statute control. Failure to comply with any applicable statute has only the
iffect which is specified therein.
istory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-203; 1969, ch. 18, §
14; 1989, ch. 218, § 48; 1996, ch. 204, § 64.

9.103 (2) ( b ) ; 1977, ch. 272,

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repealed effective July 1, 2 0 0 1 . — L a w s 2000, ch. 252, §
ffective July 1, 2001.
©
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Amendment Notes. --The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection
(1) substituted "Sections 70A-9-115 and 70A-9-116" for "Section 70A-8-321" and
"investment property" for "securities," and in Subsection (1)(a) inserted "the
collateral is investment property and the secured party has control pursuant to
agreement."
Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code.--The Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
referred to in Subsection (4), is former Title 70B, which was repealed by Laws
1985, ch. 159, § 9. Present similar provisions appear as Title 70C, the Utah
Consumer Credit Code.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transac1 i
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § J<i
A.L.R. —Sufficiency of description of crops under UCC § §
402(1), 67 A.L.R.3d 308.

9-203(b) and 9-

Conveyance of land as including mature but unharvested crops, 51 A.L.R.4th 1263,
U.C.A. 1953 §
UT ST §

70A-9-203

70A-9-203

END OF DOCUMENT
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS —- SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
PART 2. VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES THERETO
[REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
Copyright ©

1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
70A-9-205 Use or disposition of collateral without accounting permissible
[Repealed effective July 1, 2001].
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral
(including returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise accounts or
chattel paper, or to accept the return of goods or make repossessions, or to use,
commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party
to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral. This section
does not relax the requirements of possession where perfection of a security
interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured party or by a
bailee.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, §

9-205; 1977, ch. 272, § 16.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.--Laws 2000, ch. 252, §
effective July 1, 2001.

176 repeals this section

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d. —68A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 210.
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § 89.
J.C.A. 1953 §
JT ST §

70A-9-205

70A-9-205
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9, SECURED TRANSACTIONS « SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES — PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY
INTERESTS « RULES OF PRIORITY [REPEALED EFFECTIVE .JULY 3 , 2001]
Copyright ©

1 953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies, A]] rights reserved.
70A-9-302 When filing is required to perfect security interest --Security
interests to which filing provisions of this chapter do not apply [Repealed
effective July 1, 2001],
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except
the following:
(a) a security interest in collateral in possession of the secured party under
Section 70A-9-305;
(b) a security interest temporarily perfected in instruments, certificated
securities, or documents without delivery under Section 70A-9-304 or in proceeds
for a ten-day period under Section 70A-9-306;
(c) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a
trust or a decedent's estate;
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is
required for a motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is
required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided
in Section 70A-9-313;
(e) an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction with other
assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding
accounts of the assignor;
(f) a security interest of a collecting bank as provided in Section 70A-4-208,
or arising under the chapter on sales as provided in Section 70A-9-113, or covered
in Subsection (3) of this section;
(g) an assignment for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor, and
subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder.
(2) If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing under
this chapter is required in order to continue the perfected status of the security
interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this chapter is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to:
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a national or
©
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international registration or a national or international certificate of title or
which specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this chapter for
filing of the security interest;
(b) those statutes of this state which provide for the indication of security
interests on certificates of title as a condition of the perfection of such
security interests, but during any period in which collateral is inventory held for
sale by a person who is in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing
provisions of this chapter, Part 4, apply to a security interest in that collateral
created by him as debtor; or
(c) a certificate of title statute of another jurisdiction under the law of
which indication of a security interest on the certificate is required as a
condition of perfection by Subsection 70A-9-103(2).
(4) Compliance with a statute or treaty described in Subsection (3) is equivalent
to the filing of a financing statement under this chapter, and a security interest
in property subject to the statute or treaty can be perfected only by compliance
therewith except as provided in Section 70A-9-103 on multiple state transactions.
Duration and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected by compliance
with the statute or treaty are governed by the provisions of the statute or treaty;
in other respects the security interest is subject to this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, §
1996, ch. 204, § 66.

9-302; 1977, ch. 272, §

18; 1989, ch. 218, §

49;

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.--Laws 2000, ch. 252, §
effective July 1, 2001.

176 repeals this section

Amendment Notes. — T h e 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection
(1)(b) added "certficated securities"; in Subsection (1)(f) deleted "in securities
as provided in Section 70A-8-321"; and made a stylistic change.
Cross-References. --County recorder's fees, §

21-2-3.

Index of chattel mortgages, county recorder to keep, §
Required filings, §

17-21-6.

70A-11-106.

Security interests in inventory, vehicles held for sale, §

41-la-601.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — C o m m e n t , In re Littlejohn: Equitable Departure from State
:ertificate of Title Act Filing Requirements, 1975 Utah L, Rev. 726.
Washington Law R e v i e w . — U n i f o r m Commercial Code Section 9-301(1) and Accounts,
:ontract Rights, and Chattel Paper: The Non-existent Priorities, 41 Wash. L. Rev.
195.
Am.Jur.2d. — 6 8 A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § §
C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § §
A.L.R. — W h a t
©

288, 289, 293.

52 to 58.

constitutes "security interest" as to which financing
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must be filed under Uniform Commercial Code §

9-302, 11 A.L.R.3d 1231.

Determination of purchase price of farm equipment for purposes of UCC §
302(1) (c) excusing filing of financing statement, 85 A,L.R.3d 1037.

9

When is filing financing statement necessary to perfect an assignment ol accounts
under UCC § 9-302(1)(e), 85 A.L.R.3d 1050.
U.C.A. 1953 §
UT ST §

70A-9-302

70A-9-302

END OF DOCUMENT
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS -- SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES — PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY
INTERESTS -- RULES OF PRIORITY [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
Copyright ©

1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
70A-9-304
Perfection of security interest in instruments, documents, proceeds of a
written letter of credit, and goods covered by documents -- Perfection by
permissive filing —Temporary perfection without filing or transfer of possession
[Repealed effective July 1, 2001].
(1) A security interest in chattel paper or negotiable documents may be perfected
by filing. A security interest in the rights to proceeds of a written letter of
credit can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession of the letter
of credit. A security interest in money or instruments, other than instruments
which constitute part of chattel paper, can be perfected only by the secured
party's taking possession, except as provided in Subsections (4) and (5) of this
section and Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 70A-9-306 on proceeds.
(2) During the period that goods are in the possession of the issuer of a
negotiable document therefor, a security interest in the goods is perfected by
perfecting a security interest in the document, and any security interest in the
goods otherwise perfected during such period is subject thereto.
(3) A security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee other than one who
has issued a negotiable document therefor is perfected by issuance of a document in
the name of the secured party or by the bailee's receipt of notification of the
secured party's interest or by filing as to the goods.
(4) A security interest in instruments, certificated securities, or negotiable
documents is perfected without filing or the taking of possession for a period of
21 days from the time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given
m d e r a written security agreement.
(5) A security interest remains perfected for a period of 21 days without filing
/here a secured party having a perfected security interest in an instrument, a
:ertificated security, a negotiable document, or goods in possession of a bailee
>ther than one who has issued a negotiable document therefor:
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods
or the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose of loading,
mloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing, or
•therwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange, but
priority between conflicting security interests in the goods is subject to Section
OA-9-312; or

r

(b) delivers the instrument or certificated security to the debtor for the
©
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purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or of presentation, collection, renewal, or
registration of transfer.
(6) After the 21-day period in Subsections (4) and (5), perfection depends upon
compliance with applicable provisions of this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-304; 1977, •
1996, ch. 204, § 68; 1997, ch. 241, § 26.

±? ;

±.?OJ,

^i. 218, §

50;

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.--Laws 2000, ch. 252, ;'effective July 1, 2001.

] h

r^p^al.s this section

Amendment Notes. — T h e 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection
(1) deleted "certificated securities or" before the second occurrence of
"instruments"; in Subsections (4) and (5) deleted "other than" before "certificated
securities"; added "or certificated security" in Subsection (5)(b); and made a
stylistic change.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added the second sentence in
Subsection (1), relating to perfecting security interest in rights to proceeds of a
written letter of credit.
Cross-References. --Warehouse receipts, bills of lading and other documents of
title, § § 70A-7-101 to 70A-7-603.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d. — 6 8 A Am. .lui

2d Secured Transactions § §

C.J.S. — 7 9 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions §
U.C.A. 1953 §
UT ST §

476, 479.

».

70A-9-304

7 0A-9-304

END OF DOCUMENT
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — SALES OF ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
CHATTEL PAPER [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES -- PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY
INTERESTS -- RULES OF PRIORITY [REPEALED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2001]
Copyright ©

1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
70A-9-306
"Proceeds" —Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral or
debtor's insolvency [Repealed effective July 1, 2001].
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, lease, exchange,
collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by
reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that
it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement. Any
payments or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are
proceeds. Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds." All
other proceeds are "noncash proceeds."
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise provides, a
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other
disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in
the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable
proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security
interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to
be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of
the proceeds by the debtor unless:
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds
are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the
Dffice or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds
are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the financing
statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds;
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds
ire identifiable cash proceeds;
(c) the original collateral was investment property and the proceeds are
.dentifiable cash proceeds; or
(d) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of
he ten-day period. Except as provided in this section, a security interest in
»roceeds can be perfected only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted
n this chapter for original collateral of the same type.
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
ecured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected
©
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security interest only in the following proceeds:

(a) in identifiable noncash proceeds and in separate deposit accounts
containing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is neither
commingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the
insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are
not deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been
commingled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under this
Subsection (d) is:
(i) subject to any right of setoff; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings less the sum of:
(A) the payments to the secured party on account of cash proceeds received by
the debtor during such period; and
(B) the cash proceeds received by the debtor during such period to which the
secured party is entitled under Subsections (a) through (c) of this Subsection (4).
(5) If a sale or lease of goods results in an account or chattel paper which is
transferred by the seller or lessor to a secured party, and if the goods are
returned to or are repossessed by the seller, lessor, or the secured party, the
following rules determine priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale or lease, for an
indebtedness of the seller or lessor which is still unpaid, the original security
interest attaches again to the goods covered by the sale or lease and continues as
a perfected security interest if it was perfected at the time when the goods were
sold or leased. If the security interest was originally perfected by a filing which
is still effective, nothing further is required to continue the perfected status;
in any other case, the secured party must take possession of the returned or
repossessed goods or must file.
(b) An unpaid
goods against the
interest asserted
chattel paper was

transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the
transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security
under Subsection (a) to the extent that the transferee of the
entitled to priority under Section 70A-9-308.

(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the goods
against the transferor. Such security interest is subordinate to a security
interest asserted under Subsection (a).
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under Subsection
(b)
or (c) must be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and
purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods.
History: L. 1965, ch. 1 VI, §
1996, ch. 204, § 70.
©
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NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repealed effective July 1, 2001.—Laws 2000, ch. 252, §
effective July 1, 2001.

176 repeals this chapter

Amendment Notes. — T h e 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection
(3)(c), making related redesignation changes, and in Subsection (1) added the
sentence beginning "Any payments..." and made a stylistic change.
Cross-References. —Course of dealing and usage of trade, §

70A-1-205.

Entrusting possession of goods to merchant, power to transfer rights of
entruster, § 70A-2-403(2).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. —Bankruptcy Law, Secured Transactions, Bankruptcy
Trustee's Power to Avoid as Preferential a Creditor's Perfected Security Interest
Under U.C.C. Section 9-306(4) (d) in Excess Proceeds, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 938.
Am.Jur.2d. — 6 8 A Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § §
C.J.S. --79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § §

85 to 100.

117, 1.18.

A.L.R. —Effectiveness of original financing statement under UCC Article 9 after
change in debtor's name, identity, or business structure, 99 A.L.R.3d 1194.
Construction and effect of UCC § 9-311 giving debtor right to transfer his
interest in collateral, 45 A.L.R.4th 411.
Secured transactions: government agricultural program payments as "proceeds" of
agricultural products under UCC § 9-306, 79 A.L.R.4th 903.
Equitable estoppel of secured party's right to assert prior, perfected security
interest against other secured creditor or subsequent purchaser under Article 9 of
Uniform Commercial Code, 9 A.L.R.5th 708.
U.C.A. 1953 §
CJT ST §

70A-9-306

70A-9-306
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[5] The possible interests of others in
the vehicle have been adequately protected
by the legislature and should not have been
relied upon by the district court as a basis
for denial of the petition. All persons having claims in the property must be notified
of the petition for forfeiture.1 Any person
claiming an interest in the vehicle can file a
petition for release of his interest in the
property.2 If the claimant has a valid interest that is not subject to forfeiture, the
court shall order release of the property or
partial release and forfeiture,3 in which
case the property is sold and the proceeds
distributed among legitimate claimants
first4
The district judge expressed concern that
the persons penalized on forfeiture would
be the bank that loaned Arave the purchase
money for the car and Arave's father who
stood as guarantor for the loan. The
record does not show that either the bank
or Arave's father filed a claim on the vehicle. There is no assertion that they
failed to receive notice or were prevented
from entering evidence at the hearing. If
the district court concluded that they had
legitimate claims, the statute clearly provided a method for satisfaction of the
claims upon forfeiture of the vehicle.
[6] As to the final point that the value
of the car was disproportionate to the use
made of the vehicle in transporting contraband, we hold that the value of the property seized is immaterial. The statute is
devoid of any intent to the contrary. To
hold that property would not be subject to
forfeiture due to its value would seem to
be contrary to the intent and purpose of
the statute. The law was not meant to
reward the drug dealer who is "prosperous
in his traffic" by refusing to forfeit his
expensive car.5 The statute manifests the
opposite intent.
We hold therefore that the trial court
erred in denying the petition for forfeiture.
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-13(9)(c).
2. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-13(9)(e).
3. U.C.A.f 1953, § 58-37-13(9)0).

The order of denial is reversed, and the
case is remanded with direction to grant
the petition.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., dissents.
(O

| KEYNUMMft SYSTEM)

INSLEY MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
DRAPER BANK & TRUST,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 19317.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 24, 1986.
Creditor brought action against bank
for conversion of secured collateral. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judith A. Billings, J., entered judgment in
favor of creditor, and bank appealed. The
Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that creditor's perfected purchase money security interest in cash proceeds of inventory sold by
debtor had priority over bank's setoff
rights after proceeds were deposited in
debtor's account.
Affirmed.
Howe, J., concurred in result
1. Secured Transactions <&=»168
Creditor's perfected purchase money
security interest in cash proceeds of inven4. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-13(9)0)0).
5. State v. One Porsche, supra (Crockett J„ dissenting).
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tory sold by debtor had priority over bank's
setoff rights after proceeds were deposited
in debtor's account, which previously had
been overdrawn. U.C.A.1953, 70A-9104(i), 70A-9-306(S).
2. Appeal and Error <s=*173(2)
Bank could not raise issue of whether
it was holder in due course of check deposited in debtor's account for first time on
appeal.
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Kim R. Wilson, Henry C. Chai, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent
HALL, Chief Justice:
Insley Manufacturing Corp. ("Insley")
sued Draper Bank & Trust ("Draper") for
conversion of secured collateral. About a
year later, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor
of Insley. On appeal, Draper seeks reversal of the lower court order and judgment
entered in favor of its summary judgment
motion or, alternatively, that the case be
remanded for trial. We affirm.

quired, including proceeds from such sale
or rental payments received under the rental of such equipment" The H 1500-C was
shipped by Insley on March 1, 1979,
In March of 1979, Draper established
business checking account No. 81-02047-1
for Schneider. Sometime prior to October
5,1979, five checks totalling $91,621.25 and
drawn against the account were presented
to Draper for payment On October 5,
Draper determined that the account contained insufficient funds to cover the
checks and decided to pay them in overdraft Accordingly, on that date, Draper
notified Schneider in a debit memo that the
bank intended to cover the checks and
charge the account a $15 service charge
and 18% interest for use of the funds.
According to Schneider's bank statement,
however, this transaction was posted on
October 9, 1979.1

I.
Insley sold to Schneider Machinery Sales
("Schneider") an H 1500-C backhoe. Insley financed the transaction and received a
security interest in the equipment and its
proceeds on October 16, 1978. Insley then
filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State's office on November 20,
1978. The statement covered: "All Insley
Backhoes, Attachments, Accessories, and
Parts sold to Debtor by Secured Party for
resale or rental by the debtor, in which
secured party has a security interest
whether now owned or hereinafter ac-

On October 9, 1979, Schneider completed
the sale of the H 150O-C backhoe and an H
1000 backhoe to L.J. O'Brien for $237,918.30. The proceeds from the sale were
given to Schneider in the form of a check
from O'Brien's financing company, ITT Industrial Credit Company ("ITT"). The
same day, Schneider deposited the check
along with others into the Draper account.
The total deposit was $238,491.53. Draper,
in turn, credited Schneider's account for
the deposit and then paid itself from the
account for the money loaned to pay the
checks. Schneider then paid Insley $79,212.80 for the H 1000 backhoe, but could
not pay for the H 1500-C because of Draper's debit of the account A deposition
relied on by plaintiff in its summary judgment motion indicates that Schneider owed
approximately $130,000 to Insley for the H
1500-C.

1. At argument, counsel for Draper argued that a
computer printout constituting Schneider's October 1979 bank statement failed to reflect an
overdraft. However, the deposition of Draper's
president and director, Dewey Bluth, explains
that the transaction is not reflected because of
Draper's procedure in handling returnable items
and in posting transactions on its computer; in
short, the printout fails to reflect the actual

timing of events at the bank. Bluth, who approved all of Draper's items paid in overdraft,
admitted the overdraft existed. Also, the
charges listed in the overdraft debit memo correspond to those on Schneider's bank statement
In view of the facts submitted below taken in
light of the midnight deadline imposed by
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-4-301(l), the claim of no
overdraft is spurious.
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Schneider filed for voluntary bankruptcy
on August 6, 1980. Insley filed this action
on March 25, 1982. On April 7, 1983, Insley moved for summary judgment. On
April 21, 1983, Draper also moved for summary judgment based on "undisputed facts
that are presented by the Motion, Affidavits, deposition of President Dewey C.
Bluth, Draper Bank & Trust Company, and
the Memorandum submitted by plaintiff
and defendant" Insley's motion was
granted on April 26, 1983. The following
day, defendant filed its objections, claiming
material issues of fact remained. Specifically, Draper contended that there was no
evidence presented that the debtor
(Schneider) had not paid the balance owing
on the H 1500-C. Draper also moved the
court for permission to file the voluntary
bankruptcy petition and schedules attached
thereto as exhibits. Draper's motion to file
the exhibits was denied on May 18, 1983.
Further, on May 31, 1983, Insley filed a
supplemental affidavit which stated that
the indebtedness secured by the H 1500-C
backhoe had exceeded $91,621.25 since October 9, 1979, and remained unpaid on the
17th of May, 1983. Accordingly, on June 6,
2. See U.CA.,
1953, §§ 70A-9-203UM2),
-107(a), -302(1), -303(1), -401(1), -402(1), (3),
(10). The Insley/Schneider transaction was a
multistate transaction. For purposes of this
opinion, we presume sections 70A-9-103(l)(a)
and (b) are controlling. U.CA., 1953, § 70A-9109(4) provides that goods held by a person for
sale or lease are classified as inventory. See
also U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-105(l)(h).
3. See U.CA., 1953, §§ 70A-9-205, -307(1). Insley's security agreement expressly provided that
Schneider could sell the inventory in the ordinary course of business.
4. See U.CA.,
1953, §§ 70A-9-306(l)-(2),
^•203(3). The bank was not a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. See U.CA, 1953,
§ 70A-1-201(9).
5. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-9-105(e), -306(1)(2). The case law authority is almost unanimous that commingling of cash proceeds with
other funds does not necessarily make the proceeds unidentifiable. EG., CO. Funk <fr Sons,
Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 89 III. 2d 27, 31, 59
III. Sec. 85, 87, 431 N.E.2d 370, 372 (1982) (argument that security interest in proceeds terminates when deposited in bank account because

1983, the trial judge entered judgment in
Insley's favor.
II.
[1] Insley entered into the H 1500-C
security agreement with Schneider to secure the purchase price of the backhoe.
Insley then filed a UCC-1 with the proper
filing officer. Thus, after Insley delivered
the H 1500-C to Schneider, Insley had a
perfected purchase money security interest
in the inventory.2 When Schneider sold the
H 1500-C backhoe, Insley lost its security
interest in that inventory,3 but its interest
remained in the identifiable cash proceeds
(the portion of the ITT check attributable
to the H 1500-C sale price).4 When
Schneider deposited the ITT check on October 9, its account was credited with the
entire amount The account, a "deposit
account," then contained, in part, identifiable cash proceeds from the H 1500-C sale.6
Draper contends that Insley's security interest became unperfected because Draper
is not constrained by section 9-306(3).6
Such a broad assertion is untenable, however, particularly in light of the 1977
amendment to Hie Utah Code excepting
proceeds from its exclusion provisions.7
identification is impossible has found little favor in the courts); Michigan Natl Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.CApp. 690,
695, 217 S.E.2d 108, 111-12 (1975) (rule requiring separate account for earmarked proceeds
incompatible with underlying purpose of code);
Anderson, Clayton <fc Co. v. First Am. Bank,
Okla., 614 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (1980). See also
U.CA., 1953, § 70A-M02(2) (purpose of the
UCC), § 70A-9-205 (concerning in part the freedom of a debtor to commingle proceeds),
§ 70A-1-103 (code is to be supplemented by
"principles of law and equity").
6. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are
to the Uniform Commercial Code contained in
U.CA. tit. 70A.
7. The Code now provides that article nine does
not apply "to a transfer of interest in any deposit account, . . . except as provided with respect to
proceeds (section 70A-£-306) and priorities in
proceeds (section 70A-9-312)." U.CA,, 1953,
§ 70A-9-104(/). Prior to the 1977 amendment
the substance of § 70A-9-104(/) was contained at
U.CA., 1953, § 70A-9-!04(k). That provision
provided that article 9 did not apply "to a transfer in whole or in part of any of the following:
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Although Draper claimed at argument that
Insley's cited authority was inapposite, we
find that Insley's authority squarely addresses the dispositive issue in this case:8
whether section 9-104(i), stating that article nine does not apply "to any right of
setoff," has any applicability to the priority
provisions of article nine.
A small minority of jurisdictions and
some commentators have construed 9104(i) broadly, taking the position that the
provision excludes all situations concerning
setoffs, not only from the Code's security
and filing provisions, but also from the
Code's priority provisions.9 The principal
reasoning underlying these decisions is as
follows: First, the official comment to the
Uniform Commercial Code can be read as
favoring this view. For example, the official comment to 9-101 provides "[t]his Article sets out a comprehensive scheme for
the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures." Since setoffs
are excluded from the Code's definition of
security interests, it is possible to conclude
"interests in property other than security

interests are beyond the scope of all portions of Article 9." l° Second, other 9-104
exclusions, such as the "landlord's lien,"
have been construed as controlling over the
Code's priority provisions.11 Third, commentators claim the Code can be read as
indicating its drafters intended 9-104(i) to
be absolute.12 Fourth, the language in
Professor Gilmore's commentary (quoted
infra) has been extended beyond its meaning.13
A majority of jurisdictions have construed section 9-104(i) narrowly to mean
that a right of setoff may exist in a creditor who fails to comply with the security
agreement and filing provisions of article
nine, but that the section 9-104(i) exclusion
does not extend to the Code's priority provisions.14 The reasoning underlying the
majority view is significantly more persuasive than that underlying the broad interpretation followed by the minority of
courts.
In regard to section 9-104(i), Professor
Gilmore, a principal reporter for article
nine, explained:

any claim arising out of tort; any deposit, savings, passbook or like account maintained with
a bank, savings and loan association, credit union or like organization." See also Coogan,
Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in
Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses,
and Participation Agreements, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
229, 263 (1965), cited with approval in Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61
Wis. 2d 671, 684 n. 18, 214 N.W.2d 33, 39 n. 18
(1974).

1314 (4th Cir. 1981). See also National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 491
RSupp. 1269, 1273 (E.D.Va.1980).

8. Specifically, Insley cites Citizens Natl Bank v.
Mid-States Dev. Co., 177 Ind.App. 548, 380
N.E.2d 1243 (1978). Citizens National squarely
deals with offsets against cash proceeds held by
banks in deposit accounts. United States v.
Handy <fr Harman, 750 F.2d 777, 787 (9th Cir,
1984).
9. E.g., State Bank v. First Bank, Minn., 320
N.W.2d 723, 725 (1982); First Natl Bank v. Lone
Star Life Ins. Co., Tex.( 529 S.W.2d 67, 68 (1975)
(per curiam); Skilton, The Secured Party's
Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S.I1L
U.LJ. 120, 201-05.
10. See National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F.Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D.Va.
1980), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 673 F.2d

11. 1 P.Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts & J. McDonnell, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 5A.15[2] (1985).
12. See generally Note, Conflicts Between a
Bank's Common Law Right of Setoff and a Secured Party's Interest in Identifiable Proceeds, 9
Loy.U.Chi.LJ. 454, 462-65 (1978).
13. IP. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts & J. McDonnell, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 5A15[2] (1985).
14. Eg., Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin,
251 Ga. 412, 414, 306 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1983);
Farns Assocs. v. South Side Bank, 93 Ill.App.3d
766, 771-72, 49 Ill.Dec. 128, 132-34, 417 N.E.2d
818, 822-24 (1981); Citizens Natl Bank v. MidStates Dev. Co., 177 Ind.App. 548, 556, 380
N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (1978); Coachmen Indus.,
Inc. v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, Iowa, 329
N.W.2d 648, 650 (1983); Morris Plan Co. v.
Broadway Natl Bank, Mo.App„ 598 S.W.2d 557,
560 (1980); Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 11II NJ^upcr. 353, 357-58, 268
A.2d 330, 332 (1970); First Wisconsin Natl Bank
v. Midland Natl Bank, 76 Wis.2d 662, 670, 251
N.W.2d 829, 833 (1977).

INSLEY MFG. CORP. v.
Cite as 717 P^d

This exclusion is an apt example of the
absurdities which result when draftsmen
attempt to appease critics by putting into
a statute something that is not in any
sense wicked but is hopelessly irrelevant
Of course a right of set-off is not a
security interest and has never been confused with one: the statute might as
appropriately exclude fan dancing. A
bank's right of set-off against a depositor's account is often loosely referred to
as a "banker's lien," but the "lien" usage
has never led anyone to think that the
bank held a security interest in the bank
account. Banking groups were, however, concerned lest someone, someday,
might think that a bank's right of set-off,
because it was called a lien, was a security interest. Hence the exclusion, which
does no harm except to the dignity and
self-respect of the draftsmen.15
This language indicates that banks need
not comply with article nine to create a
right of setoff, but given the narrow purpose of the exclusion it is unsound to read
it as removing transactions in the commercial arena from the Code when the priority
of a setoff is involved.16 Additional support for the majority rule can be found by
examining other exclusion sections in 9104. For example, 9-104{c), the exclusion
for mechanic's liens and liens for services,
and 9-104(h), the exclusion for the judgment lienor, have their priority in terms of
secured property clearly spelled out in the
Code's various priority provisions.17 Arguably, had drafters of the Code intended
9-104(i) to exclude setoffs from the priority
provisions, they would have expressly so
provided as they did with other exclusion
sections. This rationale may be extended
further by examination of 9-201, which
provides that security agreements are effective according to their terms between
15. G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property 315-16 (1965).
16. Eg., Citizens Natl Bank, 177 Ind.App. at 555,
380 N.E.2d at 1248.
17. See, e.g.,
-301<l)(b).

U.C.A.,

1953.

§§ 70A-9-310,

18. National Acceptance Co., 498 RSupp. at 1084.

RAPER BANK & TRUST

Utah

1345

41 (Utah 1986)

the parties, and against third-party creditors, except as otherwise provided by the
Code. There is no express provision in the
Code suggesting a perfected security interest is subordinate to a right of setoff.
Further support for a narrow interpretation of 9-104(i) is gleaned from examination
of 9-306(4)(d), which provides:
In the event of insolvency proceedings
instituted by or against a debtor, a secured party with a perfected security
interest in proceeds has a perfected security interest only in the following proceeds:
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of
the debtor in which proceeds have been
commingled with other funds, but the
perfected security interest under this
paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of setoff....
The contention is that "this provision would
be unnecessary if the relative priority of
any right of set-off was unaffected by Article 9 because all perfected security interests, and not merely those recognized under section 9-306(4Xd), would be equally
'subject to any right of setoff/ " 1 8
Moreover, section 1-102l* mandates that
the Code is to be liberally construed to
promote its underlying purposes and policies, including the clarification of the law
governing commercial transactions. The
purpose and concept of notice filing would
be significantly weakened if we held that
Draper is not bound by that which it would
have discovered through a proper inquiry.20
Finally, section 9-205 provides in part
14
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty
in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose
of all or part of the collateral . . . or to use,
commingle or dispose of proceeds
"
19. Principles of construction found in chapter
one are integrated into article nine by section
70A-9-105(4).
20. See Fartts Assocs., 93 IH.App.3d at 772, 49
IlLDec. at 133, 417 N.E.2d at 823.
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The purpose of the provision is to relieve
creditors from the age-old requirement of
policing collateral in the hands of a debtor.
Adoption of the minority approach places
such a duty on creditors and * 'would severely undercut significant values of certainty, efficiency and reliance which are at
the heart of the Codal emphasis on public
filing/'21 A secured party should be able
to rely on his compliance with the Code's
requirements for perfection and his search
of the record as against an unrecorded
interest of a setting-off bank.22
In its brief, Draper contends that proceeds in the form of checks which are
deposited in checking accounts should not
be held in abeyance for ten days. Draper implies that such a result is necessary if
this Court rules in favor of Insley. Drafters of the Code were also concerned with
this problem. Section 4-208 provides that
a collecting bank has a perfected security
interest in a deposited item as a matter of
law when it credits a customer's account in
reliance on the deposited item. The section
also gives the collecting bank priority in
the security interest.25 In this case, however, Draper, while standing in the shoes of
a payee bank, determined on October 5,
1979, that Schneider's account contained
insufficient funds to cover the presented
items. Draper could have most easily and
least expensively avoided this dispute;
Draper could merely have returned the
items it covered for Schneider in overdraft24 Instead, Draper advised Schneider
on October 5 that it was extending nearly
$100,000 to cover the checks. A debit
memo in the record indicates that Draper
notified Schneider that Draper was charging Schneider a $15 fee and 18% interest
for this "service." This transaction was
not secured since the bank was not lending
against a deposited item.

Draper contends that section 9-306(4)
governs the priority dispute in this case
since Schneider was not able to cover the
checks as they were presented to the bank.
Draper relies on Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Weyerhaeuser Co,25 However, that case is easily distinguished. In
Citizens & Southern, the bank exercised
its right of setoff only after the debtor
acknowledged in writing that it was in default, authorized the bank to take possession of its assets, and ceased operations.
Here, the fact that Draper agreed to lend
Schneider the funds to pay the checks on
October 5 establishes that Schneider was
solvent; a company is not insolvent merely
because it has to pay its bills with borrowed funds. The court in Citizens National Bank M was unpersuaded by a similar argument:
This argument is without merit It is
premised on a misconstruction of the language and purpose of section 9-306<4Xd).
The triggering phrase of that section is
"In the event of insolvency proceedings
instituted by or against a debtor
" It
is plain that the limiting provisions of
subsections (4XdXi) and (ii) are to serve
as tracing rules for the secured party
asserting an interest in proceeds only
when they are brought within the debtor's estate in an insolvency proceeding.
Here the funds in question were not
made a part of Huntington's estate in
bankruptcy. For purposes of determining the validity and extent of Soya's proceeds security interest, the subsequent
institution of bankruptcy proceedings in
the present case is irrelevant Since the
limitations contained in section 9306(4Xd) have no operation outside the
area of insolvency proceedings the trial
court properly disregarded them.27

21. Id.

25. 152 Gaj\pp. 176, 262 S.E.2d 485 (1979).

22. Citizens Natl Bank, 177 Ind.App. at 559r 380
N.E.2d at 1249.

26. 177 Ind-App. at 548, 380 N.E.2d at 1243.

23. See also U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-9-203(l), 9302(l)(f), 9-312(1).
24. U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-4-301.

27. Id. at 553, 380 N.E.2d at 1246 (citations omitted). See also National Acceptance Co,, 498
F.Supp. at 1084 n. 5 ("present proceedings,
while occasioned by Structures' insolvency, are
not insolvency proceedings, defined at section
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This is not an insolvency proceeding instituted by or against Schneider. Further,
Schneider's bankruptcy in 1980 has no
bearing on this case since the conversion
occurred on October 9, 1979.
Analysis of the facts of this case pursuant to section 9-306(3) shows that Insley's
purchase money security interest in the
proceeds was perfected on October 9.2S As
noted above, Draper was an unsecured
creditor on October 9. Although no specific rule deals directly with the priority conflict between Insley's perfected security interest and Draper's setoff rights, we believe that the Code's priority rules require
that Insley's interest must prevail over
Draper's right of setoff. The cornerstone
of the Code's complex priority provisions,
section 9-201, provides in pertinent part:
"Except as otherwise provided by this act a
security agreement is effective according
to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against
creditors." As stated in Continental
American Life Insurance Co.:w "The effect of this section is to give the Article
Nine secured party, upon a debtor's default, priority over 'anyone, anywhere, anyhow* except as otherwise provided by the
remaining Code priority rules." Since
there are no other rules in the Code to
resolve the conflict, section 9-201 is controlling.

entitled to the deposit account. Draper
may not raise this issue for the first time
on appeal.30

[2] Draper also contends that it was a
holder in due course and thus took the
instrument free of Insley's security interest. However, the record does not reflect
that Draper argued the holder-in-duecourse theory below. Its papers all reflect
argument as to why it and not Insley was

The judgment is affirmed. Costs to Insley.

1-201(22) of the Code"); Michigan Natl Bank,
26 N.CApp. at 695. 217 S.E.2d at 112.

Code, and Insley's security interest would have
remained in the deposit account until depleted
in the ordinary course of Schneider's business.

28. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-9-306(3)(b), (c),
-302(l)(b).
29. 251 Ga. at 414, 306 S.E.2d at 287 (citations
omitted).
30. Kg, Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., Utah, 692
P.2d 754, 758 (1984). Even if Draper was a
holder in due course, it would only take the ITT
check free of Insley's security interest. The
credit to Schneider's deposit account given in
exchange for the check was proceeds under the

Draper's claim that disputed material
facts should have prevented the granting
of Insley's motion is not well taken. Specifically, Draper claims there is a question
as to whether Schneider fully or partially
paid the H 1500-C debt Contrary to
claims in Draper's brief, Insley filed an
affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment which states the debt exceeded $91,621.25 as of January 24, 1983.31
Only after the denial of Draper's motion
did counsel attempt to introduce Schneider's bankruptcy schedules, though the
same were available prior to the lower
court order. Even if the trial court had
permitted the schedules into evidence, the
fact they show Insley as having no security
interest in an H 1500-C does not support
Draper's claim of disputed material facts.
The sale to O'Brien of the H 1500-C (the
only H 1500-C Schneider ever received) cut
off Insley's security interest in the H 1500C. Moreover, the schedules do show Insley with a security interest in proceeds of
sale of $142,000. Finally, when Draper
raised the issue in its objections, Insley
filed another affidavit stating the balance
was still owing. There are no disputed
facts.

STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.

31. The affidavit provides in part: "5. In October 1979, Schneider Machinery Sales owed Insley Manufacturing in excess of $91,621.25 on
the H 1500-C backhoe. 6. Demand has been
made upon Schneider Machinery Sales for payment, but Schneider Machinery Sales has failed
to pay the amount it owes to Insley." (Emphasis added.)
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Beginning Balance
Trij&t Money
Other
Total Beginning Balance
Transfer from Sail Lake Volvo WFB Account:
Trust Money
Other
Transfer from Arizona WFB Account.
Trust Money
Other
Transfer from Southwest WFB Account
Trust Money
Olher
Transfer Irom Idaho WFB Account:
Trust Money
Other
Transier to Great Basin Trucks FSB Account
Trust Money
Other
Transitu Irom Great Basin Trucks FSB Account
Trust Money
Oiher
Other Receipts and Disbursements
Receipts
Disbursements
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1031,955
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490 45B
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678 571
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578.917
174,415
753.332

S
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192,734
597.043
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631.063
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2.349,774

80.656
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39.830
69.652

15.438

125 925
18,848
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16.359

158.257
66,637

42.751

16695
30,660
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27.194

12.245
63.433

2.855

87,350
121.434

3.608

104 490
49.928

33.172

6.000
81.734

6S.427
2.046

$

1.691,585
299 615
1,991.200

S

1.691.585
1,297 489 44
2.989.074

18,819

29.098.93

36.632

9.17981

S

1.125.001

S

:

661.274
661.274

$

S
(281056)
(261.056)

S
f'90,161)
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S
(828 951)
(B28,951)_S

(53,310)
J53.310)

100,334
13.321

1.130.712
18.896
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1.788 83

31,230

(566.58435)
(933,416)
900.000
Transfer
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564.834
110.682
r.242
242521
(763.207)
(1 209 564)
(223 578)
(457.056)
(434 743)
616383 S 1.099 191 S 753,332 S 632 689 S 396.309 t

125.925
490.458

420.620
678.571

578.917
174.415

648.344
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632.699
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16.450
132.734)
(531 174)
(333 2e9)
(3399091
597.043 S 2,270.574 S 2.349.774 t 1391.200 $

1.011,385
166961)
2.989 074 S

404.309
192.734

1691.585
1.297.489

1.639.510
631.063

1,651.755
698.019

1691585
299.615

2.500 00
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1.125001
S
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S
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GREAT BASIN COMPANIES • FIRST SECURITY BANK (222-00085-32)
Beginning Balance
Trust Money
Other
Total Beginning Balance

S

$

$
50,904

Transfer From WFB Concentration Account
Trust Money
Other
Transier |o WFB Concentration Account
Associated Foods Truck Payment (Trust Money)
Johnston Supply Truck Payment (Tnisl Money)
Other Receipts and Disbursements
Receipts
Disbursements
Ending Balance
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1.066.584
1.180 5B7

S 1,066,584
1,311271

$

1.099.214
1,011,571

$ 1.099.214
1,130.786
2.230.002

1.066.584
933.416
(900,000)
1.832.967

(300,000)
32.630
50,904

s

s

s

s

s

-- $

$

s

s

$

s

50,904

S

196.267

130.685

300

2,247.171

$ 2.377 856

$ 2.110 786

119,217

_$_

2.230.002

63.132
(261.717)
3.014,385

-^

5 2.982.181
32 203
S 3,014.385
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Supreme Court of Nebraska.
CITY OF LINCOLN
v.
MORRISON ET AL.

May 21, 1902.

Syllabus by the Court.
*905 1. Misappropriation of a trust fund does not
entitle cestui que trust, merely as such, and for that
reason alone, to a preference over general creditors of
an insolvent trustee.
2. In order to obtain a preference, cestui que trust
must show that the estate out of which he claims such
preference has been increased to some extent by the
misappropriation of the trust property, and he is
entitled to a preference to the extent of such increase
only.
3. Where a trustee mingles trust moneys with his
own funds, cestui que trust is entitled to a charge
upon the whole; and, so long as any portion of the
mass into which the trust fund has entered remains in
any form, it is subject to such charge, and may be
followed and claimed.
4. The burden is upon cestui que trust to show that
the trust money did in fact increase the estate out of
which he seeks a preference, or is represented therein
in some form. But it seems that where such money
has gone into the general estate of a trustee, who
afterwards becomes insolvent, there is a presumption
that it remains therein at his insolvency; and the court
will not say that it cannot be traced or has wholly
disappeared, where the contrary may fairly be
inferred.
5. It is presumed that moneys drawn out of a fund
wherein the trustee has mingled his own money and
that of cestui que trust are his own, and, so long as
any portion of the fund so constituted remains, it may
be followed, and the charge of cestui que trust
thereon may be asserted.
6. But if the whole of such fund, or a greater portion

Pagel

thereof than that representing the trustee's own
money, is used by an insolvent trustee in paying his
debts, cestui que trust is not entitled to a preference
over general creditors for the amount of his money so
lost.
7. Property or assets of the insolvent trustee acquired
before, or with the proceeds of property held before,
the trust money came into his hands, and not in any
way mingled therewith, are not subject to any lien or
claim in cestui que trust, and the rights of the latter
with respect thereto are those of a general creditor
only.
8. A change in the form of a portion of a fund in
which money of the trustee personally and of cestui
que trust has been mingled is not necessarily a
withdrawal of such portion. When the trustee retains
such portion and dissipates the remainder, the portion
retained in the altered form is taken to represent such
fund, and may be claimed by cestui que trust.
9. Where a portion of a fund made up of trust money
and of individual money of the trustee is invested,
and a profit results, cestui que trust, in following the
trust money into the investment, may claim such
profits as the proceeds of the original fund upon
which he had a charge, at least to the extent of said
charge upon the original fund.
*906 10. Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank,
60 N. W. 115, 49 Neb. 786, 59 Am. St. Rep. 572, and
State v. Midland State Bank, 71 N. W. 1011, 52 Neb.
1, 66 Am. St. Rep. 484, limited. State v. Bank of
Commerce, 75 N. W. 28, 54 Neb. 725, and Morrison
v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 77 N. W,
655, 57 Neb. 225, adhered to.
Commissioners' opinion. Department No. 2. Error to
district court, Lancaster county; Holmes, Judge.
In the matter of the insolvency of the Lincoln
Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Company. In such
matter the city of Lincoln intervenes, seeking a
preference over the general creditors, and from the
denial of the same it brings error. Reversed.
West Headnotes
Trusts € = > 3 4 2
390k342 Most Cited Cases
Where the whole of a fund created by the moneys of
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a trustee and those of his beneficiary is used by an
insolvent trustee in paying his own debts, the
beneficiary is not entitled to a preference over the
general creditors for the amount of his money so lost.
Trusts €=>342
390k342 Most Cited Cases
Misappropriation of a trust fund does not entitle the
beneficiary for that reason alone to a preference over
general creditors of an insolvent trustee.
Trusts € ^ 3 4 2
390k342 Most Cited Cases
Assets of an insolvent trustee, acquired before or
with the proceeds of property held before the trust
money came into his hands, and not in any way
mingled therewith, are not subject to any lien in favor
of the beneficiary.
Trusts €^^353
390k353 Most Cited Cases
The burden is on a beneficiary to show that the trust
money did in fact increase the estate out of which he
seeks a preference, or is represented therein in some
form.
Trusts € = > 3 5 3
390k353 Most Cited Cases
Where a trustee retains a portion of a fund in which
his own money and that of the beneficiary has been
mingled, and dissipates the remainder, the portion
retained may be claimed by the beneficiary.
Trusts € > ^ 3 5 3
390k353 Most Cited Cases
Where a trustee mingles trust property with his own
funds, a beneficiary is entitled to a charge upon the
whole, and, so long as any portion of the mass into
which the trust fund has entered remains in any form,
it is subject to such charge and may be followed and
claimed.
Trusts € = > 3 5 3
390k353 Most Cited Cases
In order that a beneficiary of an insolvent trustee
may obtain a preference, he must show that the estate
out of which he claims such preference has been
increased to some extent by the misappropriation of
the trust property, entitling him to a preference to the
extent of such increase.
Trusts C=>354
390k354 Most Cited Cases
Where a portion of a fund made up of trust money
and of individual money of the trustee is invested,
and a profit results, the beneficiary, in following the
trust money into the investment, may claim such
profits as the proceeds of the original fund on which
he had a charge, to the extent of said charge on the
original fond.
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Trusts €=>358(2)
390k358(2) Most Cited Cases
Funds.
Where trust money has been wrongfully commingled
by a trustee with his own, and he makes payment
from the common fund, it will be presumed that he
paid out his own, and not trust, money.
Lambertson & Hall, for plaintiff in error.
A. S. Tibbetts and L. C. Burr, for defendants in error.
POUND, C.
This is a petition in error prosecuted by the city of
Lincoln, an intervener in a suit brought to wind up
the Lincoln Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Company,
other phases whereof have been before this court
several times. The plaintiff in error by its petition in
intervention sought a preference over general
creditors for some $5,000,—a balance of moneys of
said city loaned to the bank upon certificate of
deposit by the city treasurer in contravention of law,
and with knowledge on the part of the bank officers
as to whose money it was. It appeared from a
stipulation of the parties and from the evidence
adduced that on April 9, 1895, the city treasurer
placed $6,095.35 of the city's funds in the bank,
taking a certificate of deposit therefor. Afterwards
$1,055.35 was paid on the certificate, and a new
certificate was issued for $5,000. After said deposit
was made, the bank had on deposit, in all, about
$240,000, of which $41,699.96 was on hand in cash.
On December 16, 1895, the bank suspended. At that
time the deposits had fallen to about $150,000, or, to
be precise, $92,534.43 had been paid out to
depositors between the time when the city's money
had been placed in the bank and the date of
suspension. No money was loaned and no
investments were made during this period, except
that on April 16, 1895, the bank bought state warrants
of the market value of $36,750, using in payment
therefor $1,750 of the cash on hand, and $35,000
borrowed of a bank in New York. The remainder of
the cash on hand on April 9, 1895, and such moneys
as accrued from collection or sale of paper already in
the bank, it used in paying depositors and in running
expenses. At the time the bank suspended there was
but $200 cash on hand. This sum had been pledged to
secure sureties upon a supersedeas bond in a case
wherein judgment had been rendered against the
bank, and was afterwards applied upon such
judgment. A receiver was appointed on January 22,
1896. When he took possession he received
$1,562.61 in cash, and "cash items" to the amount of
$239.07. He also received $3,334.37 from sale of the
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warrants above referred to; such sum being the
$1,750 originally invested therein, and the profit after
repaying the money borrowed to make the purchase.
But it appears from the evidence that the cash and
cash items which came into the hands of the receiver
accrued from loans made by the bank, or from paper
which it held, before the city's money was deposited
therein. The district court, upon this testimony, found
generally for the receiver, and dismissed the city's
petition.
Under the rulings of this court in Morrison v.
Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 57 Neb. 225,
77 N. W. 655, and State v. Bank of Commerce, 54
Neb. 725, 75 N. W. 28, several of the questions
raised may be disposed of readily. But the former
case does not of necessity involve the questions
presented by the case at bar, nor were the facts such
as to require an affirmance of State v. Bank of
Commerce, supra, while the latter case is vigorously
assailed by counsel, and we are asked to overrule it,
and to reaffirm the rule recognized in prior decisions.
Ordinarily we should not feel justified in reviewing a
question determined by two recent decisions of this
court. Were it a mere matter of these two decisions,
so long as we feel satisfied that they are sound, we
should do no more than cite them, and proceed to
apply them to this controversy. But in several prior
cases (State v. State Bank of Wahoo, 42 Neb. 896, 61
N. W. 252; State v. Midland State Bank, 52 Neb. 1,
71 N. W. 1011, 66 Am. St. Rep. 484; and especially
Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, 49 Neb.
786, 69 N. W. 115, 59 Am. St. Rep. 572) this court
had expressly or by strong implication recognized
and adopted a different rule. The cases last cited are
sought to be distinguished in State v. Bank of
Commerce, supra. Counsel have pointed out,
however, that the attempt to distinguish the latter case
from Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank,
supra, is founded on an entire misapprehension of the
facts there presented; and, in any event, the reasoning
in these two cases and the authorities severally relied
on therein cannot be reconciled. For this reason we
think it expedient to state plainly that this court no
longer adheres to the extreme view as to the right of
cestui que trust to be preferred on insolvency of the
trustee, expressed in the cases of State v. State Bank
of Wahoo, State v. Midland State Bank, and Capital
Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, but adheres to the
position taken in State v. Bank of Commerce and
Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co.,
supra; to set forth our reasons for rejecting the one
view and adopting the other; and to state as clearly
and definitely as we may the rules by which causes
such as the one at bar are to be decided.
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The origin of the rules now recognized *907 with
respect to following trust money which has been
mingled with the personal funds of the trustee, or has
passed into his general estate, is to be found in the
opinion of Jessel, M. R., in Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13
Ch. Div. 696. Prior to that decision it was said that
money had no earmark, and that when a trust fund, in
the form of money, became mingled with the moneys
of the trustee personally, it lost its identity and could
not be traced. Since that vigorous and convincing
judgment, the idea that money, as such, could not be
traced, and that trust property lost its identity when
turned into money and confused with the trustee's
funds, has been abandoned completely. But the limits
of the extension of the rights of cestui que trust with
respect to the property of insolvent trustees, to which
the decision in Knatchbull v. Hallett gave rise, were
not perceived at first. All which that decision did was
to wipe out the old dogma that money had no
earmark, and to substitute the sensible rule that
whenever trust property enters into a mass, to which
the property of cestui que trust and that of the trustee
have contributed, so long as the trust property
remains in or forms a part of such mass, cestui que
trust has a claim or charge thereon to that extent, and
general creditors cannot take advantage of or derive a
benefit from, the increase in the assets due and
traceable to misappropriation of the trust fund.
Several courts in this country, however, went much
further, and established a rule which, though
generally abandoned or modified in the more recent
authorities, is still adhered to in some quarters, and at
one time had the support of the decisions of this
court. McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173,
57 Am. Rep. 287; Bank v. Hummell, 14 Colo. 259,
23 Pac. 986, 8 L. R. A. 788, 20 Am. St. Rep. 257;
Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156, 1 Pac. 499, 46 Am.
Rep. 90; Myers v. Board, 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658, 37
Am. St. Rep. 263; Evangelical Synod v. Schoensich,
143 Mo. 652, 45 S. W. 647; Tierman's Ex'r v.
Association, 152 Mo. 135, 53 S. W. 1072;
Independent Dist. v. King, 80 Iowa, 497, 45 N. W.
908; Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa, 722, 45 N. W.
1049, 20 Am. St. Rep. 442. The supreme court of
Iowa has receded somewhat in District Tp. of Eureka
v. Farmers' Bank of Fontanelle, 88 Iowa, 194, 55 N.
W. 342. And a divided court in Wisconsin has
overturned McLeod v. Evans, supra, which was itself
the decision of a divided court. Silk Co. v. Flanders,
87 Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383. See, also, Bircher v.
Walther (Mo.) 63 S. W. 691. But this court, in
Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, supra,
expressly refused to follow the latter case, and
adhered to McLeod v. Evans. In the view of these
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authorities, if trust property has been misappropriated
and has gone into the estate of the trustee, cestui que
trust is to be preferred, and is to receive his money to
the exclusion of general creditors. As the court put it
in Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, supra,
the question is not one of identifying or claiming a
sum actually deposited, but of compelling the
insolvent to first restore the trust property, treating
that as something which he had no power to
commingle with other funds, but must keep whole
and make up so long as he has any funds or property
out of which to do so. Other cases do not go so far
expressly, but reach the same result, either by holding
that, if the insolvent trustee uses the whole fund to
pay his debts, the effect is to increase his general
estate, and create a charge thereon in favor of cestui
que trust, or by ruling that, when the trust fund is
once traced into the general property of the trustee, it
is conclusively presumed to remain there. McLeod v.
Evans, supra; Peak v. Ellicott, supra; Myers v. Board,
supra; Independent Dist. v. King, supra.
We are not able to agree to the rule just stated in any
of the forms which it has assumed. We are satisfied
that the court did well when, in State v. Bank of
Commerce, it withdrew its support therefrom, and
took a position in accord with the great weght of
recent authority. The court was in error in saying (54
Neb. 731, 75 N. W. 28) that the moneys which came
into the hands of the receiver of the Capital National
Bank on its insolvency were more than sufficient to
meet the preferred claims established in Capital Nat.
Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, supra, and its
companion cases. Such sum was greater than the
preferred claim established in any one suit, but the
aggregate considerably exceeded it, and the record in
each case showed that fact. Hence State v. Bank of
Commerce is not reconcilable with prior decisions of
the court, and must stand on its own foundation,
which we think it may do safely. Not only is it in
accord with the overwhelming majority of recent
decisions upon this point, and with the general
tendency to abandon or recede from McLeod v.
Evans and the cases following that decision, but on
principle it is clearly right. Of express decisions in
the last three years upon this very point, we may cite
Ellicott v. Kuhl, 60 N. J. Eq. 333, 46 Atl. 945;
Collins v. Steuart, 58 N. J. Eq. 392, 44 Atl. 467;
Same v. Lewis, 60 N. J. Eq. 488, 46 Atl. 1098;
Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, 78 Minn. 357, 81 N. W.
20; Beard v. Independent Dist., 60 U. S. App. 372, 31
C. C. A. 562, 88 Fed. 375; Robinson v. Woodward
(Ky.) 48 S. W. 1082; Wilbern v. Timmons, 55 S. C.
466, 33 S. E. 568; Byrne v. McGrath, 130 Cai. 316,
62 Pac. 559, 80 Am. St. Rep. 127; Shutt v. Hinman,
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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34 Or. 578, 58 Pac. 832, 56 Pac. 412, 47 L. R. A.
265; Bircher v. Walther (Mo.) 63 S. W. 691. These
cases, and many others cited in State v. Bank of
Commerce, supra, and Morrison v. Lincoln Sav.
Bank & Safe Deposit Co., supra, establish clearly that
misappropriation of a trust fund does not entitle
cestui que trust, merely *908 as such, and for that
reason alone, to a preference over general creditors of
an insolvent trustee. So long as the trust property, in
any shape or form, can be recognized, it belongs to
cestui que trust. So long as it enters into any fund
property, or mass of assets in any way, cestui que
trust has a charge or lien, which he may enforce upon
the whole. But if the trustee "destroys a trust fund by
dissipating it altogether, there remains nothing to be
the subject of the trust." Wood, V. C , in Frith v.
Cartland, 2 Hem. & M. 417. In such case, cestui que
trust has no specific claim against any property or
fond. He is merely a creditor of the trustee, and
stands on the same basis as other creditors. The right
to a preference is based on his ownership of some
specific fund or assets, or on a claim or charge upon
all the fond or assets, because his property is
contained in, or has contributed to, them. In other
words, to obtain a preference, cestui que trust must
show that the estate out of which he claims such
preference has been increased to some extent by the
misappropriation of the trust property, and he is
entitled to a preference to the extent of such increase
only. This proposition in no way detracts from, and is
but another way of stating, the general rule,
announced in the cases cited, that, where a trustee
mingles trust moneys with his own funds, cestui que
trust is entitled to a charge upon the whole, and, so
long as any portion of the mass into which the trust
fond has entered remains in any form, it is subject to
such charge, and may be followed and claimed. In
State v. Bank of Commerce and Morrison v. Lincoln
Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co. it was held that the
burden is upon cestui que trust to show that the trust
money did in fact increase the estate out of which he
seeks a preference, or is represented therein in some
form. This is only to say that a plaintiff must prove
his case. He claims a specific fond as his, or he
claims a charge on the general mass of assets, and he
must show the facts to justify his claim. But we think
this should not be pushed too far. When it is once
proved that trust money has gone into the general
estate of a trustee who afterwards becomes insolvent,
it would seem that we ought to presume, in the
absence of other evidence, that it remains therein at
his insolvency, and that we ought not to say it cannot
be traced, or has wholly disappeared, where the
contrary may fairly be inferred. Sherwood v. Bank,
103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W. 352; Independent Dist. v.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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King, 80 Iowa, 498, 45 N. W. 908. In the case at bar
the city showed that its money was put into, and
became part of, the general fund of "cash on hand" in
the bank. It appeared also that the receiver came into
possession of cash or "cash items" amounting to
some $2,000. If these facts stood alone, we should
feel obliged to allow the city a preference to the
extent of what came into the receiver's hands when he
took possession. State v. Bank of Commerce, 54 Neb.
725, 75 N. W. 28. But as the evidence stands, it is
clearly proved that the cash and cash items taken over
by the receiver do not represent the city's money in
any form. The city's money entered into, and was part
of, the $41,000 cash on hand on April 9, 1895. The
city had a charge on that fund for its money.
Whatever moneys were drawn out of that fund and
dissipated are presumed to be those of the bank. The
portion that remains in the bank, in whatever form, is
taken to be and represent the trust fund, and to be
liable to be followed and claimed as such by the city.
But if the whole of the cash on hand into which the
city's money entered, or a greater portion thereof than
that representing the bank's own money, was used in
paying off other depositors or in running expenses,
the city is not entitled to a preference over general
creditors for the amount of its money so lost.
Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co.,
57 Neb. 725, 77 N. W. 655; Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N.
Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504; Collins v. Steuart, 58 N. J. Eq.
392, 44 Atl. 467; Ellicott v. Kuhl, 60 N. J. Eq. 333,
46Atl. 945.
All of the cash on hand after the city's money
became mixed therein, with the exception of the
$1,750 used in the purchase of warrants, which will
be considered presently, and the $200 in the bank
when it suspended, was used in paying debts and
expenses. The $200, as has been seen, was pledged to
indemnify sureties on the bank's bond, was
afterwards paid on the judgment superseded thereby,
and never came into the receiver's control. In other
words, except said sum of $1,750, it was wholly
dissipated. Although there are decisions to the effect
that the mere fact of use of the money in the trustee's
general business or in paying his debts is, in effect,
an increase of the assets, and suffices to create a
charge thereon, that position is entirely at variance
with the principle by which such cases must be
governed, and is repudiated by all the later
authorities. Spokane Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 29 U. S.
App. 707, 66 C. C. A. 85, 68 Fed. 979; Metropolitan
Nat. Bank v. Campbell Commission Co. (C. C.) 77
Fed. 27; Bank v. Latimer (C. C.) 67 Fed. 705; Bircher
v. Walther (Mo.) 63 S. W. 691. As the court said in
Spokane Co. v. First Nat. Bank, supra, "even if it is
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proven that the trust fund has been but recently
disbursed, and has been used to pay debts that
otherwise would be claims against the estate, there
would be manifest inequity in requiring that the
money so paid out should be refunded out of the
assets; for in so doing the general creditors, whose
demands remain unpaid, are, in effect, contributing to
the payment of the creditors whose demands have
been extinguished by the trust fund." Moreover in
this case the money which came *909 into the hands
of the receiver when he was appointed was the
proceeds of loans made before the city's money came
into the bank. For reasons already stated, it must be
manifest that property or assets of the insolvent
trustee acquired before, or with the proceeds of
property held before, the trust money came into his
hands, and not in any way mingled therewith, are not
subject to any lien or claim in cestui que trust, and
that the rights of the latter with respect thereto are
those of a general creditor only. District Tp. of
Eureka v. Farmers' Bank of Fontanelle, 88 Iowa, 194,
55 N. W. 342.
We come now to the money derived fromtsale of the
warrants. It will be remembered that after the city's
money came into the bank it bought the warrants,
using $1,750 of the moneys in which the funds of the
city had been mixed, and $35,000 borrowed on
security of the warrants. The receiver contends that
since there was over $40,000 in cash in the bank at
the time, of which but $6,000 belonged to the city, it
will be presumed that the $1,750 was the bank's own
money. Such would be the case, without doubt, had
the bank withdrawn the money and dissipated it in
some fashion. But it did not do this. It merely
changed the form of a portion of the fund in which
the city's money had been wrongfully mixed. After
purchase of the warrants said fund was represented
by the cash still in the bank, and by the bank's interest
in the warrants. State warrants are readily convertible
into cash. If the bank preferred to keep part of its
cash fund as warrants, the identity of the fund was
not changed. So long as any portion of the fund into
which the city's money entered may be traced into
money which came to the receiver, the city may
assert the claim which it had upon the whole fund.
The warrants were all that remained of that fund. In
accordance with the presumption that whatever was
retained and not dissipated was the city's money, and
not the bank's, these warrants and their proceeds in
the hands of the receiver represent money to which
the city has a prior claim, and in which general
creditors have no right to share. The city's right to
follow the money does not fail because no one can
say what part of the cash on hand in the bank went
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into the warrants. The city had a charge upon the
whole in any form in which the bank might keep it.
When all was wasted except the warrants, that charge
remained upon them, because they were a part of that
fund, though in an altered form. Knatchbull v.
Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696; Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y.
272, 25 N. E. 319; Byrne v. McGrath, 130 Cal. 316,
62 Pac. 559, 80 Am. St. Rep. 127; Bank v. King, 57
Pa. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215; Smith v. Combs, 49 N. J.
Eq. 420, 24 Atl. 9; Third Nat. Bank v. Stillwater Gas
Co., 36 Minn. 75, 30 N. W. 440. We do not think this
view of the transaction in question conflicts in any
way with the holding of Bradley, J., in Frelinghuysen
v. Nugent (C. C.) 36 Fed. 229, followed in Central
Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U.
S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693, and Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S.
670, 10 Sup. Ct. 354, 33 L. Ed. 696, and approved in
Morrison v. Lincoln Sav. Bank & Safe Deposit Co.,
57 Neb. 225, 77 N. W. 655. In Frelinghuysen v.
Nugent, the cashier of a bank had wrongfully turned
over large sums to a partnership engaged in
manufacturing, under such circumstances as to make
the latter constructive trustees. The evidence
indicated that the money had been entirely dissipated,
and there was nothing to show that the stock on hand
represented the trust fund, or a fund with which it had
been mixed in any form. On the contrary, it was clear
that said stock had been bought recently on credit,
and represented the debts of general creditors. But in
the case at bar a portion of the fund into which the
city's money entered is traced directly into the
warrants, in which form that portion was held till the
bank suspended. The warrants were a cash asset, and
the money thus held was still fairly to be called a part
of the cash fund. It was not made way with, and it
came into the receiver's hands, on sale of the
warrants, as the last remnant of the fund with which
the city's money had been mixed. The city had a
charge upon the warrants, as upon the fund with a
portion whereof they were bought, for the full
amount of its moneys contained in said fund. Hence
its claim upon the proceeds is not limited to the
$1,750 which was used in buying them, but extends
to the profit accruing therefrom, as well. The
$3,334.37 which came into the hands of the receiver
upon sale of the warrants represents the cash fund in
which the city's money was mixed, and the profits of
an investment of that fund. The profits of trust money
belong to cestui que trust, and we see no warrant for
limiting recovery to the actual sum invested,
especially where there is not enough, in any event, to
satisfy the charge on the original fund. Farmers' &
Traders' Bank v. Kimball Milling Co., 1 S. D. 388, 47
N. W. 402, 36 Am. St. Rep. 739; Brown v. Ricketts,
4 Johns. Ch. 303, 8 Am. Dec. 567; Frank's Appeal,
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59 Pa. 190; Butler v. Hicks, 11 Smedes & M. 78.
We therefore recommend that the order of the
district court be reversed, and the cause remanded,
with directions to enter a new order granting the city
a preference to the extent of the proceeds of said
warrants, namely, $3,334.37.
BARNES and OLDEAM, CC, concur.
PER CURIAM.
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the
order of the district court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded, with directions to enter an order granting
the plaintiff in error a preference to the extent of
$3,334.37.
57 L.R.A. 885, 64 Neb. 822, 90 N.W. 905
END OF DOCUMENT
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Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
BRENNAN
v.
TILLINGHAST.
TILLINGHAST
v.
BRENNAN.
Nos. 2,253, 2,254.
January 7, 1913.

Deposits in bank after insolvency, see note to
Richardson v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 43 C C A .
588.)
Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Northern Division of the Western District of
Michigan; Arthur C Denison, Judge.
Bill by John Brennan against Philip Tillinghast, as
receiver of the First National Bank of Ironwood,
Mich. From a decree awarding complainant a part of
the relief demanded, both parties appeal. Affirmed.
West Headnotes
Appeal and Error €^^719(9)
30k719(9) Most Cited Cases
Where plaintiffs claim against defendant bank was
allowed as an offset in accordance with the prayer of
complainant's bill, and no error was assigned with
reference thereto, the court would not review an
objection that it should have been allowed as an
offset against complainant's claim as a general
creditor.
Banks and Banking
52k75 Most Cited Cases
Where a bank receives deposits with knowledge that
it cannot pay its debts, and must fail in business, the
depositor may reclaim it if he can trace it into the
bank's assets coming into the hands of the receiver.
Banks and Banking
52k75 Most Cited Cases
Mere insolvency of a bank at the time it received a
deposit from complainant held insufficient to entitle
him to rescind and recover the deposit from the
receiver, where it did not appear that the bank's

officers did not have reasonable hopes that by
continuing in business the bank might retrieve its
fortunes.
Banks and Banking C ^ 7 5
52k75 Most Cited Cases
Receipt of a deposit from a customer with
knowledge that the bank was insolvent does not
constitute such fraud as would authorize a rescission,
where it was received with the understanding that it
should be used to pay the depositor's debt to the bank.
Banks and Banking € ^ 8 0 ( 6 )
52k80(6) Most Cited Cases
An insolvent bank having wrongfully converted
certain stock deposited with it as collateral security,
the owner held to have sufficiently followed the
proceeds into the hands of the bankrupt's receiver to
entitle him to a preferred claim thereto.
Trusts €=>352
390k352 Most Cited Cases
Where proceeds of stock wrongfully sold by a bank
constituted a trust fund, it did not lose such character
by being mingled with other moneys of the bank.
Trusts €=>358(2)
390k358(2) Most Cited Cases
Proof that a tortfeasor has mingled trust funds with
his own and made payments thereafter out of the
common fund is a sufficient identification of the
remainder as constituting a trust fund.
Trusts € = 3 7 2 ( 1 )
390k372(l) Most Cited Cases
The presumption that a tort-feasor, having mingled
trust funds with his own, drew out his own moneys,
and that the balance included the trust fund, is a mere
presumption, which will not stand against evidence to
the contrary.
Trusts € ^ 3 7 2 ( 1 )
390k372(l) Most Cited Cases
The presumption that a tort-feasor, having mingled
trust funds with funds of his own, first paid out his
own funds, has no application where the payment
was a mere transfer of a part of the fund in a
substituted form to another fund retained in his
possession.
*611 Charles M. Humphrey, of Ironwood, Mich., for
John Brennan.
I. A. Fish and Quarles, Spence & Quarles, all of
Milwaukee, Wis., for the receiver.
Before WARRINGTON and KNAPPEN, Circuit
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Judges, and SANFORD, District judge.
SANFORD, District Judge.
John Brennan, the complainant below, filed a bill in
the Circuit Court, sitting in equity, against the First
National Bank of Ironwood, Mich., an insolvent
banking association, and Philip Tillinghast, receiver
of said bank, the defendants below, seeking to
recover as preferred claims against the bank the value
of certain stock deposited by Brennan with the bank
as collateral and sold by the bank, and the sum of
$1,000 deposited by Brennan with the bank a short
time before it was placed in the hands of the receiver.
The court, on final hearing, allowed the first of these
items as a preferred claim, and disallowed the
second.
Brennan and the receiver have each
appealed from this decree; and the two appeals have
been heard together.
The material facts are these:
The First National Bank of Ironwood, Mich.,
hereinafter called the Ironwood Bank, was organized
as a national banking association in 1888, and
conducted a banking business in Ironwood until June
21, 1909, when it closed its doors, and Tillinghast
was appointed as its receiver by the Comptroller of
the Currency.
On February 1, 1909, Brennan borrowed from the
Ironwood Bank the sum of $1,000, for which he
executed his promissory note, due in four months,
with interest, and deposited with the bank as
collateral security certificates for certain shares of
mining stock, including 200 shares of the capital
stock of the Shattuck-Arizona Copper Company.
On April 8th Brennan deposited with the Ironwood
Bank the sum of $1,000, for which he received a
certificate of deposit. This deposit was received by
the cashier of the bank, with the understanding at the
time that it was to be used in paying Brennan's note at
its maturity.
The receiver admitted in his answer that the bank
was insolvent from February 1st, when the note was
given, to June 21st, when the receiver was appointed,
including the date, April 8th, on which the deposit
was received; and the cashier who received the
deposit testified that he had known for about ten
years before that the bank was insolvent.
On May 1st the Ironwood Bank, through its cashier,
without the knowledge or consent of Brennan, sold

195 of the shares of the stock of the Shattuck-Arizona
Copper Company which it held as collateral to his
note, the proceeds of which, $3,558.75, were on that
day deposited in the City National Bank of Duluth,
Minn., hereinafter called the Duluth Bank, to the
credit of the Ironwood Bank, in a pre-existing open
account.
Against this open account in the Duluth Bank, in
which other deposits were made from time to time,
the Ironwood Bank drew from day to day various
drafts to meet its daily clearing house balances. *612
And from May 1st to May 8th, inclusive, the
Ironwood Bank also drew four drafts on the Duluth
Bank against this open account, in favor of the
American
Express
Company,
for
amounts
aggregating $2,807.32. These drafts were purchased
by the express company from the Ironwood Bank on
the dates on which they were drawn, and the express
company on such dates paid the Ironwood Bank the
amounts of such drafts, in cash, over its counter. At
all times from May 1st to May 10th, inclusive, the
open account of the Ironwood Bank at the Duluth
Bank, after crediting all deposits made and deducting
all drafts drawn, showed a balance in favor of the
Ironwood Bank, varying in amount from day to day,
but always in excess of $3,558.75. On May 10th this
balance amounted to $4,273.39.
On May 11th,
however, this account of the Ironwood Bank at the
Duluth Bank was overdrawn in the sum of $1,068.75.
On June 14th, after Brennan's note had fallen due
and when he did not know that any part of his stock
had been sold by the Ironwood Bank, he, after a
conversation with its cashier, who advised him to let
the note run, gave up his original intention of paying
his note with his certificate of deposit, and, instead,
paid the Ironwood Bank the interest due on his note,
and gave the bank a renewal note for the principal.
In addition to these transactions, Brennan also had a
checking account with the Ironwood Bank, and, when
its doors closed, owed it for an overdraft on this
account the sum of $216.07.
The books of the Ironwood Bank furthermore show
that at all times from February 1st until it closed on
June 21st there was $8,000 or more of cash on hand
in its vaults, and $15,652.23 in cash came into the
hands of the receiver. And, while it appears that the
bank books contained many false cash entries, the
evidence fully sustains the finding of the court below
that from and after April 8th until the closing of the
bank it had continually on hand in cash in its own
vaults more than $3,500.
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The remainder of the stock held by the bank as
collateral on Brennan's note has been returned by the
receiver to Brennan.
The evidence further showed that claims had been
filed against the Ironwood Bank aggregating
$603,000; that the Comptroller of the Currency had
levied an assessment of 100 per cent, on its
stockholders; that 30 per cent, dividends had already
been paid to creditors; that not exceeding 10 per cent,
more could be paid; and that the other claims for
preferences which had been filed and which were still
pending aggregated between $3,500 and $4,000.
On this state of facts we have reached the following
conclusions:
[1] 1. The court below correctly held that Brennan
was entitled to recover as a preferential claim, to be
paid in full, the sum of $3,558.75 received by the
Ironwood Bank from the sale of his stock, less the
amount of his note, $1,000, and of the overdraft,
$216.07, leaving a balance of $2,342.68, for which
sum he was granted a decree against the receiver.
[2] It is undisputed that the proceeds of the sale of
Brennan's stock, wrongfully converted by the
Ironwood Bank to its own use, constituted *613 a
trust fund, which did not lose this character when
mingled with other moneys of the bank, and that
Brennan was entitled to recover the amount thereof
as a preferred claim, if, and to the extent that, he
sustained the burden of proof of tracing this money,
either in its original shape or in a substituted form,
into the moneys which came into the hands of the
receiver as part of the assets of the bank. Peters v.
Bain, 133 U.S. 670, 693, 10 Sup.Ct. 354, 33 L.Ed.
696; Board of Commissioners v. Strawn ( C C A . 6)
157 Fed. 49, 54, 84 C C A . 553, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.)
1100; In re Brown ( C C A . 2) 193 Fed. 24, 29, 113
C C A . 343, affirmed sub nom. First National Bank
of Princeton v. Littlefield, 226 U.S. 110, 33 Sup.Ct.
78, 57 L.Ed
; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll
County ( C C A . 8) 194 Fed. 593, 604, 114 C C A .
435, and cases cited.
[3] And proof that the tort-feasor has mingled the
trust funds with his own and made payments
thereafter out of the common fund, is, nothing else
appearing, a sufficient identification of the remainder
of that fund coming into the hands of the receiver, not
exceeding the smallest amount the fund contained
subsequent to the commingling, as trust property,
under the legal presumption that he regarded the law

and neither paid out the trust fund nor invested it in
other property, but kept it sacred.
Board of
Commissioners v. Strawn, supra, at page 51; Empire
State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, supra, at page
605, and cases cited.
Applying these general principles, we are of opinion
that the court below correctly held that the proceeds
of the sale of Brennan's stock constituted a trust fund
held by the Ironwood Bank for his benefit; that the
transactions in connection with the four cash drafts
drawn in favor of the express company constituted, in
effect, a transfer of $2,807.32 of this trust fund in
cash to the vaults of the Ironwood Bank; that this
portion of the trust fund must be deemed to have
remained in the vaults of the Ironwood Bank as part
of the trust fund, in cash, until it came into the
possession of the receiver; and that as the amount
thus remaining in the trust fund was more than
sufficient to cover the balance to which Brennan was
entitled from the proceeds of the sale of his stock,
after deducting the amount due from him to the bank
on his note and overdrafts, he had successfully traced
the balance of the trust fund thus due to him into the
cash assets that came into the hands of the receiver,
and was hence entitled to be paid the same as a
preferential claim.
It is urged, however, in behalf of the receiver that the
cash draft transactions should not be regarded as a
transfer of $2,807.32 of this trust fund to the vaults of
the Ironwood Bank, for the reason that, after the last
of these cash drafts was drawn on May 8th, there
remained to the credit of the Ironwood Bank at the
Duluth Bank until May 10th a balance of $4,273.39,
or more than the amount of the trust fund, which was
not dissipated until this balance was changed into an
overdraft of $1,068.75 on May 11th; the argument
being that under this state of facts it should be
presumed that the Ironwood Bank first drew on its
open account in the Duluth Bank for its own
purposes, intending to leave the trust fund
unimpaired; that the $4,273.*614 39 remaining in the
Duluth Bank on May 10th hence included the trust
fund; and that, as this balance was subsequently
dissipated by drafts drawn by the Ironwood Bank for
its own purposes, it cannot, for that reason, be traced
into the cash which came into the hands of the
receiver from the vaults of the bank.
[4] It is true that in the case of blended moneys in a
bank account, consisting in part of trust funds, from
which there have been drawings from time to time, it
has been held, in favor of the cestui que trust, as a
presumption of law, that the sums first drawn out
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were from the moneys which the tort-feasor had a
right to expend in his own business, and that the
balance which remained included the trust fund,
which he had no right to use. In re Hallett's Estate,
13 Ch.D. 696, 727; Board of Commissioners v.
Strawn, supra, at page 51. It is clear, however, in the
first place, that this is a mere presumption, which will
not stand against evidence to the contrary. Board of
Commissioners v. Strawn, supra, at page 51.
[5] And it is furthermore clear that this rule of
presumption has no application where the evidence
shows that the first moneys drawn out of the mingled
fund by the tort-feasor were not in fact dissipated by
him at all, but were merely transferred, in a
substituted form, to another fund retained in his own
possession. In such case, it must be held that the
trust attaches to the substituted form in which the
property is retained by the tort-feasor, and that the
right to follow the trust in such form is not lost by
reason of the fact that the tort-feasor thereafter draws
out and spends for his own purposes the balance of
the fund in which the trust money was originally
mingled. The English case of In re Oatway, L.R. 2
Ch. 356, 359 directly sustains this view. In that case
Oatway, a joint trustee under a will, had sold a
portion of the trust property and deposited the
proceeds to his own credit in bank with other funds
belonging to himself. Out of this deposit, consisting
in part of the proceeds of the converted trust fund and
in part of his own moneys, Oatway purchased certain
shares of stock in the Oceana Company, which he
took and retained in his own name. Thereafter he
drew out and paid away irrevocably for his own
individual purposes the entire remainder of the bank
deposit. It was held that, under this state of facts, the
cestui que trust was entitled to follow the shares of
stock thus purchased by Oatway. Joyce, J., said:
'If money held by any person in a fiduciary capacity
be paid into his own banking account, it may be
followed by the equitable owner, who, as against the
trustee, will have a charge for what belongs to him
upon the balance to the credit of the account. If,
then, the trustee pays in further sums, and from time
to time draws out moneys by checks, but leaves a
balance to the credit of the account, it is settled that
he is not entitled to * * * maintain that the sums
which have been drawn out and paid away so as to be
incapable of being recovered represented pro tanto
the trust money, and that the balance remaining is not
trust money, but represents only his own money paid
into the account. * * * It is, in my opinion, equally
clear that when any of the money drawn out has been
invested, and the investment remains in the name or

under the control of the trustee, the rest of the balance
having been afterwards dissipated by him, he cannot
maintain that the investment which remains
represents his own money alone, and that what has
been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered
was the money belonging to the trust. *615 * * * The
order of priority in which the various withdrawals
and investments may have been respectively made is
wholly immaterial. * * * In the present case there is
no balance left. The only investment or property
remaining which represents any part of the mixed
money paid into the banking account is the Oceana
shares purchased for . . . 2,137.
Upon these,
therefore, the trust had a charge for the . . . 3,000 trust
money paid into the account. That is to say, those
shares and the proceeds thereof belong to the trust.
The investment by Oatway, in his own name, of the .
. . 2,137 in Oceana shares no more got rid of the
claim or charge of the trust upon the money so
invested than would have been the case if he had
drawn a check for . . . 2,137 and simply placed and
retained the amount in a drawer without further
disposing of the money in any way. The proceeds of
the Oceana shares must be held to belong to the trust
funds under the will of which Oatway and Maxwell
Skipper were the trustees.1
In like manner we are of opinion that in the present
case it must be held that the transfer by the Ironwood
Bank to its own vaults, through the cash draft
transactions, of $2,807.32, of the balance standing to
its credit in the Duluth Bank in which the trust fund
had been mingled, did not divest the money thus
transferred of its character as a trust fund, but as this
money remained thereafter in its own vaults and in its
own custody, and subsequently passed into the hands
of the receiver as part of the cash assets of the bank,
it remained subject in all respects to the trust
originally impressed upon the proceeds of the sale of
Brennan's stock.
2. The court below correctly held that the amount of
the $1,000 deposit was not a preferred claim, but that
as to this sum Brennan was a general creditor of the
Ironwood Bank, to be paid by the receiver the same
percentage of dividends that had been and should be
paid to other general creditors.
[6] It is true that where a bank, being hopelessly
insolvent, receives a deposit, with the knowledge that
it cannot pay its debts and must fail in business, this
is such a fraud upon the depositor that he may rescind
the contract of deposit and reclaim the amount so
deposited or its proceeds, if traced into the assets of
the bank coming into the hands of the receiver, in like
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manner as other trust funds. St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
Johnston, 133 U.S. 566, 576, 10 Sup.Ct. 390, 33
L.Ed. 683; Standard Oil Co. v. Hawkins ( C C A . 7)
74 Fed. 395, 398, 20 C C A . 468, 33 L.R.A. 739; City
Bank v. Blackmore ( C C A . 6) 75 Fed. 771, 773, 21
C C A . 514; Richardson v. Coffee Co. ( C C A . 5) 102
Fed. 785, 789, 43 C C A . 583; Hutchinson v. Le Roy
(CCA. 1) 113 Fed. 202, 209, 51 C C A . 159.
[7] However, the mere fact that the bank is known to
be insolvent at the time the deposit is received is not
in our opinion sufficient of itself, without more, to
confer this right of rescission upon the depositor, and
such right of rescission would not arise when the
bank at the time of receiving the deposit, although
embarrassed and insolvent, yet had reason to believe
that by continuing in business it might retrieve its
fortunes; the necessary condition upon which the
right of rescission is predicated being that the deposit
was received when the bank was hopelessly
embarrassed and so circumstanced as to constitute its
receipt of the deposit a fraud upon the depositor. See
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Johnston, supra, at pages 576,
577.
*616 In the present case it merely appears that the
bank was insolvent at the time this deposit was
received, and had been known to be insolvent for ten
years previously by the cashier who received the
deposit. The extent of its insolvency at that time is
not shown, nor is there any evidence as to what
subsequent events precipitated the condition which
caused its doors to close, or whether or not at the
time the deposit was received the bank, although
embarrassed and insolvent, yet had reasonable hopes
that by continuing in business it might retrieve its
fortunes, just as it had previously continued in
business for the ten preceding years during which it
had been insolvent.
In the light of this meager
evidence, we agree in the view expressed by Judge
Denison, then district judge, who heard this case
below, who said:
There is no reason to think in this case that the
suspension of the bank was any more imminent on
April 8th than it had been for a long time, or that the
cashier or bank officers anticipated the closing of the
bank or had any expectation that complainant would
not receive his money when he should ask for it~
except their general and vague fear that they might
fail to tide over their difficulties. This does not seem
to me to raise the necessary trust. Complainant's own
showing is that for more than 60 days the deposit
would have been repaid on demand, and that it was
practically offered to complainant when the note was

renewed. For these reasons, I think complainant is
not entitled to any preference upon his certificate of
deposit, but should prove the same as a general
creditor.'
[8] And, whatever would have been the result
otherwise, we think it cannot properly be held that
the receipt of this particular deposit constituted a
fraud upon Brennan within the rule entitling him to
follow it as a trust fund, in the light of the undisputed
facts, shown by his own testimony that at the time the
deposit was made the bank held his $1,000 note for
borrowed money, and the deposit was made with the
'understanding' that it would be used in payment of
this note at maturity. As this deposit was hence,
under this evidence, in effect taken by the bank as
quasi security for the payment of a just debt due to
itself, this circumstance alone, in our opinion,
relieves the bank from the imputation of fraud in
receiving the deposit, which might otherwise have
existed if the deposit had been merely received in the
ordinary course of dealings between the bank and a
customer not indebted to it.
[9] 3.
It is furthermore suggested in behalf of
Brennan that the court below should have allowed his
$1,000 note as an offset against his claim as general
creditor under his certificate of deposit, instead of
allowing it, in effect, as an offset against his preferred
claim arising out of the sale of his collateral. It is
frankly conceded, however, in the brief filed in his
behalf that the opposite view was taken by his
counsel in the court below, and it appears, from an
examination of the pleadings, that the decree of the
court below in allowing this offset against Brennan's
preferred claim for the proceeds of his stock was
entirely consistent with the prayer of the
complainant's bill. Furthermore, Brennan, under his
appeal, has assigned no error in reference to the
action of the court in this respect. In this state of the
record there is obviously nothing in the decree of the
court below in this respect of which Brennan is
entitled to now complain.
*617 4. Finding no error in the decree below, it must
be in all things affirmed. A decree will be entered
accordingly, dismissing both appeals, and taxing each
appellant with one-half of the costs of the appeals.
201 F. 609, 120 C C A . 37
END OF DOCUMENT
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In re OAT WAY. -...
HEKTSLET v. OATWAY.

JOYCE J.
1903
April 22, 24;
May 2. .

[1902 0. 273.]
Trustee—Breach of Trust—Following Trust Money—Banking Account—}£$
\ Fund—Investment—Appropriation of Fayments.
Where a trustee paid trust money into his banking account whWebi
it became mixed with his own money, and out of moneys drawn fromtilf
account purchased an investment in his own name, but subseq'ue^^P
.applied the balance to his own. purposes, his representatives caijnof
successfully maintain that the investment was purchased out o p $ | |
trustee's own money, and that what has been spent, and can no h^m
be traced and recovered, was the money belonging to the trust.
Frown v. Adams, (1869) L. B. 4 Ch. 764, is overruled .by In re F^sWjjl
Estate, (1880) 13 Oh. D. 696.

was a creditor's action for the administration of i
estate of Lewis John Oatway, a solicitor, who died insolvefl
in 1902. The defendant Christiana Mary Oatway was 1
sole executrix. In the course of the administration a quesftof|
arose as to the title to a sum of 2474JL 19s., being the proceeds^
sale of 1000 shares in ai company called the Oceana Companf!
• which at the date of the testator's death were standing m € | |
name.
The testator and one Maxwell Skipper were co-trustees un'dl
the will of Charles Skipper, deceased. In 1899' and 1900.stim||
amounting to 3000Z. were advanced in breach of trust ouMl
Charles Skipper's estate to Maxwell Skipper upon the secuif§|
of a mortgage of an undivided share of certain real estate S
which he was entitled under his grandfather's will. In 19|1
Maxwell Skipper went abroad, having given to Oatway a powl|
of attorney under which and as mortgagee he on August 'ijm
1901, sold Maxwell Skipper's reversionary interest for the stM
of 7000Z. This sum Oatway paid into his own banking accoui|S
which at that time was in credit to .the extent of 771.13^«|S
He did not replace the 3000Z. which had been advanced t W
Maxwell Skipper out of Charles Skipper's trust estate. . ;.|H
On August 15, 1901, Maxwell Skipper'was indebted.^
THIS

ffrCh.

w . . . .•
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^Oatway in the sum of 1779Z. 7s. Id., and also in a further JOYOE or.
1903
|tinascertiained amount in respect of costs.. :
%$•< On August 24, 1901, Oatway purchased the Oceana shares.OATWAT,
In re.
Ifor 2137Z, 125. 3d., which he paid for by a cheque on his BJSBTSLET
V.
l i n k i n g account. Before the purchase of the shares Oatway OATWAY.
Ijiad made further payments into the account to the extent
iof 301. Is. lid., and. had drawn out sums amounting to
|i510L8s. Qd.; so that when he drew the cheque for 2137Z. 12s. 3d.
i|in payment for the shares the credit balance of his account
||was*6635Z. 6s. Ad., which sum included the 3000Z. belonging
p o the estate of Charles Skipper.
|p. After paying for the shares, Oatway paid further sums
pinto the account, but his subsequent drawings for his own
purposes exhausted the whole amount standing to his credit,
|and there was nothing to represent the 3000Z. except the
^proceeds of the Oceana shares.
1|^ This was a summons taken out by Maxwell Skipper, who
||was also a defendant to the action, asking that the sum of
^2474?.* 19s., being the proceeds of the Oceana shares, might be
ifgaid to him either in his personal capacity or as trustee under
jj|.the will of Charles Skipper.
WiAvAten-GarimeU, for the .applicant. Oatway was bound
pwhen he received the 7000Z. to replace the 3000Z., which, in
pleach of trust, had been advanced to Maxwell Skipper out of
|$liarlesj Skipper's estate. He then had to /account to Maxwell
||§iipper for the balance of the 7000Z. The whole of the
||700(K having disappeared except that which can be traced
ll&to the Oceana shares, the proceeds of those shares clearly
g|elong to the applicant either personally or as trustee.
| p In a case of this sort the second part of the holding in In re
WZaUetPs Estate (1) does not apply. It cannot be said that the
^shares were bought by Oatway out of his own money, and
ttkat therefore he is entitled to hold them as against the
Keneficiaries under-Charles Skipper's will. Where a trustee
llj&s mixed trust money with his own and has purchased land
l | r chattels out of the mixed fund, the beneficial owner can
Sjt'

(1) 13 Ch. D. 696.
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CB^OERY DIVISION.

[Igq^
'•P
JOYCE J. follow t h e trusfc money and is entitled to a charge on .|(i|
1903
purchased property: In re Hallett's Estate, (1) . The agplicaai'
does not desire to press his personal claim to the proceeds o'
OATWAYJ
In re,
the shares, provided that, the Skipper trust gets t h e benefit^
HBBTSLXT
t h e m ; b u t he submits that he is entitled to recover agaia§£
V.
.OATWAY.
Oatway's estate.
,\£
Yoionger., E.G., and Ashworth James, for the plaintiffs, ^|j§
were beneficiaries under Charles Skipper's will. The proceeds
of the Oceana shares clearly belong to the Skipper trust.
DiMvrhy E.G., A . WhitaJcer, and Grossfield, for the defendant
Christiana Mg<ry Oatway. "When Oatway bought the shai$£
the .balance to'his credit at the bank was sufficient to enable
him to pay for them apart from th,e 3000Z, trust money. Q?j£
proceeds of the shares belong to Oafcyvay's estate. It was .*
own money which he drew out to pay for them. He w?
entitled as against Maxwell Skipper to do that: In re HaUeii^
Estate. (1)
'
.4/
Cur. adv. vvM*i
May 2. JOYCE J . Oatway was co-trustee with Maxwe
Skipper of the will of Charles Skipper, the father of the latter;,
I n breach of trust 3000Z. was advanced from the trust ti
Maxwell Skipper upon the .security .of a mortgage given by hifrf
to Oatway alone. Oatway, as mortgagee, and under a pow$|
of attorney from Maxwell Skipper, sold t h e mortgaged prti*
perty, and as mortgagee received a n d gave a receipt for ife&
3000Z. trust money, part of t h e proceeds of sale, vMM
amounted to 7000Z. T h e rest h e received as agent of or cr
behalf of Maxwell Skipper, from w h o m h e held a power <ot
attorney. Oatway, instead of investing t h e 3000Z. upon proper
trust securities in the joint names of himself and Maxwell'
Skipper, the trustees,, paid i n the whole 7000Z. on August 15>r
1901, to his own banking account, which was then in credit lt<|
the amount of 171. 13s. 4dL : Between August 15 and 24 >Jbfe
paid i n sums amounting to 30Z. and drew out 510L, which ha
paid away to creditors or,otherwise applied to his own purposei n such a manner as to be irrecoverable.
(1) 13 Oh. D. 696.

f&lCh.
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Ilk'Qn August 24, out of the- balance to the credit of the JOYCES J.
Recount, Oatway paid 2137L..12s. 3d. for the purchase of
1903
pertain shares in the Oceana Company,-.which remained in his OATWAY,.
In re.'
|?name at the time of his decease, and have since been sold by
HJBBTSLET
^arrangement. I t is the proceeds of these shares which is now
v,
[fix question. The balance to the credit of the account after OATWAT,
pbhis payment, with some other sums paid in from time to time
§§by Oatway, was subsequently exhausted by his drawings on
phis own account.
.
p|*<T?he balance of the 7000L, after discharging the mortgage,
belonged to Maxwell Skipper, but it is alleged that Oatway
||ss. a creditor of his had claims thereon to a large amount.
IpMaxwell Skipper, who was himself a party to the original
ifbreach of trust, could not under, the circumstances, and in fact
pices not, oppose the claim of the trust to the proceeds of the
p|bceana shares. For the purposes of this case we may consider
^jOatway to have been entitled to the balance of the 7000Z.
|$fter discharging the 3000L mortgage.
*
pj; There is no conflict between -different fiduciary owners or
S&ets of cestuis que trust. It is a- principle settled as far back
||as the time of the Year Books that, whatever alteration of
ffforni any property may undergo, the true owner is entitled to
pseize it in its new shape if he can prove the identity of the
i&riginal material: see Blackstone, vol. ii. p. "405, and Lujpton.
gjf. White. (1) But this rule is carried no farther than necessity
|?requires, and is applied only to cases where the compound
ft"
as-such as to render it impossible to apportion the respective
^shares of the parties Thus, if the quality of the articles
jfthut are mixed be uniform, and the original quantities
§.kuown, as in the case .of so many pounds-xof trust money
||Eiixed with so many pounds of the trustee's^own money,
ifee person by whose act the confusion took place is still
Entitled to claim his proper quantity,. but subject to the
Iquantity of the other proprietor being first made good out of
pthe whole m a s s : 2 Stephen's Commentaries (13th ed.), 20.
Prust money may be followed into land or any other property in
& h i c h it has been invested; and when a trustee has, in making
H

(1) (1808) 15 Yes. 432; 10 B. K. 94.
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any purchase ot investment, applied trust money together ^ |
his own, the cestuis que trust are entitled to a charge oa-..tjj|
property purchased for the amount of the. trust money laid ij^
in the purchase or investment. Similarly, if money held 0M
any person in afiduciarycapacity be paid into his own banla$||
account, it may be followed by the equitable owner, who, J|$|
against the trustee, will have a charge for what belongs to hxm
upon the Balance to the credit of the account. If, then, t\M
trustee pays in further sums, and from time to time draws otH
money by cheques, but leaves a balance to the credit of thl|
account, it is settled that he is not entitled to have the rule-ip
Clayton's Case (1) applied so as to maintain that the SUEQ||
which have been drawn out and paid away so as to be incapabfef
of being'recovered represented pro tanto the trust money, ai
that the balance 'remaining is not trust money, but represent
only his own moneys "paid into the -account. Brovmi^
Adams (2) to the contrary ought not- to be followed sini
the decision in In re Hallett's Estate. (3) It is, in my opinidtf
equally clear that when any of the money drawn out
been invested, and the investment remains in the name icp
under the control of the trustee, the rest of the balance having!
been afterwards dissipated. by him, he cannot maintain th"aj|
the investment which remains represents his own money alon^l
and that what has been spent and. can no longer be traced?
and recovered was the money belonging to the trust. 1$a
other words, when the private money of the trustee' and|
that which he held in a fiduciary capacity have been mixers
in the same banking account, from which various payments^
have from time to time been made, then, in order to defer**]
mine to whom any remaining balance or any investment.!
that may have been paid for out of the account ought to be|
deemed to. belong, the trustee must be debited with all thdj
sums that have been withdrawn and applied to his own use so|
as to be no longer recoverable, and the trust money in likej
manner be debited with any sums taken out and duly invested^
in the names of the proper trustees. The order of priority inl
' {i

(1) (1816) 1 Mer. 572; 15 B. B. 161.
(3) IS Gh. D. 696.

(2) L. B. 4 Gh. 764. . |
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,361

.CHANCEEY DIVISION.

Ivrhich the various withdrawals and investments may have JOYCE J.
1903
fbeen respectively made is wholly immaterial. I have been
Preferring; of course, to cases where there is only one fiduciary QATWAYr
In re.
downer or set of cestuis^ que trust claiming whatever may be
HEETSLET
;*left as against the trustee. In the present case there is no
' v.
OATWAY.
fbalanoe left. The only investment or property remaining
Iwhich represents any part of the mixed moneys paid into the
^bankitfg account is the Oceana shares purchased for 2137Z.
fOpon these, therefore, the trust had a charge ior the 30001.
Siarust money paid into the account. That is to say, those
Ishares and the proceeds thereof belong to the trust.
^ It was objected that the investment in the Oceana shares
|was raade at a time when Oatway's own share of the balance
jdfo the credit of the account (if the whole had been then justly
fdistributed) would have exceeded 2137Z., the price of the
tshares; that he was therefore entitled to withdraw that sum,
[and might rightly apply it for his own purposes; and that
^consequently the shares should be held to belong to his estate.
lio this I answer that he nevei*was entitled to withdraw the
$137Z. from the account, or, at all events, that he could not .be .
^entitled to take that sum from the account and hold it or the
^investment made therewith, freed from the charge in favour of
Spe trust, unless or until the trust money paid into the account
Sad been first restored, and the trust fund reinstated, by due
Investment of the money in the joint names of the proper
^trustees, which never was done.
f: The investment by Oatw&y, in his own name, of the 21371. i n .
[Oceana shares no more got rid of the claim or charge of the
$rust upon the money so invested, than would have been the
§Jase if he had drawn a cheque for 21S1L ana dimply placed
p&d retained the amount in a drawer without further disposing
St the money in any way. The proceeds of the Oceana shares
%
p u s t be held to helong to the trust funds under the will of
|vhich Oatway and Maxwell Skipper were the trustees,
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Part II. Constructive Trusts And Analogous Equitable Remedies
Chapter 13. Following Property Into Its Product
§ 212. Effect Of Withdrawals And Subsequent Additions
Link to Case Citations
Where a person wrongfully mingles money of another with money of his own and makes withdrawals
from the mingled fund and dissipates the money so withdrawn, and subsequently adds money of his own to
the fund, the other can enforce an equitable lien upon the fund only for the amount of the lowest intermediate
balance, unless
(a) the fund or a part of it earns a profit, or
(b) the subsequent additions were made by way of restitution.
Comment:
a. The lowest intermediate balance. Where a person wrongfully deposits in a single account in a bank money of
another and money of his own, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and dissipates the money so withdrawn, and
subsequently makes additional deposits of his own funds in the account, the other person cannot ordinarily enforce
an equitable lien upon the account for a sum greater than the lowest intermediate balance of the deposit. If the
amount on deposit at all times after the deposit of the claimant's money equaled or exceeded the amount of his
money so deposited, the claimant is entitled to a lien upon the deposit for the full amount of his money so deposited.
If after the deposit of the claimant's money the deposit was at any time wholly exhausted by withdrawals before
subsequent deposits of the wrongdoer's individual funds were made, the claimant's lien upon the deposit is
extinguished, and if he is unable to trace the money withdrawn, he is relegated to a mere personal claim against the
wrongdoer, and is entitled to no priority over other creditors of the wrongdoer.
Illustrations:
1. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out
$1500 and dissipates it. He later deposits $1000 of his own in the account. B is entitled to a lien on the account
for $500, the lowest intermediate balance.
2. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out
$1000 and dissipates it. He later deposits $500 of his own in the account. B is entitled to a lien on the account
for the full amount of $1000, since the account was never diminished below that sum.
3. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out the
whole $2000 and dissipates it. He later deposits $500 of his own in the account. B is not entitled to a lien on the
account.
Copr. © 2004 The American Law Institute.
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Comment on Clause (a):
b. Where the balance earns a profit If the lowest balance is invested and earns a profit, the claimant can
enforce an equitable lien not only for the amount of the lowest balance but also for the amount of the profit earned
by it, although not for more than the total amount of his money which was wrongfully deposited in the account. The
claimant is, however, entitled at his option to enforce a constructive trust as to a proportionate share of the product
under the rule stated in § 211, although he thereby obtains more than the total amount of his money.
Illustration:
4. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out
and dissipates $1500. He invests the remaining $500 in shares of stock which he sells for $1500. B is entitled to
a lien on the proceeds for $1000. If he sells the shares for $3000, B is entitled at his option to enforce a
constructive trust as to one-half of the proceeds, or $1500.
Comment on Clause (b):
c. Where later deposits made in restitution. Where a person wrongfully deposits in a single account in a bank
money of another and money of his own, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and subsequently makes
additional deposits of his own funds in the account, manifesting an intention to make restitution of the claimant's
money withdrawn, the claimant's lien upon the deposit is not limited to the lowest intermediate balance. The effect
of making the additional deposits by way of restitution for the amount withdrawn is the same as though the amount
so restored had not been withdrawn.
The mere fact, however, that a wrongdoer has deposited in his own account money of another and has made
withdrawals and subsequently deposits money of his own in the account does not raise an inference of an intention
to make restitution. On the other hand, if he deposited the money of another in a fiduciary account for the other, and
wrongfully withdrew part of the money and subsequently made additions of his own money, the inference is that he
intended to make restitution.
Comment:
d. Redeposit of money withdrawn. The rule stated in this Section is not applicable where the money withdrawn
or traceable proceeds of that money are redeposited. If the money withdrawn from the account is subsequently
redeposited in the account, the effect is the same as though the withdrawal had not been made, and the claimant's
lien is not limited to the lowest intermediate balance. It is immaterial whether the money withdrawn was itself
redeposited, or the money withdrawn was invested and the investments were sold and the proceeds were
redeposited.
Illustrations:
5. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out
$1500 of which he dissipates $1000 and redeposits the remaining $500 in the account. B is entitled to a lien on
the account for $1000.
6. A wrongfully deposits in a bank $1000 belonging to B together with $1000 of his own. He draws out the
whole $2000 with which he purchases shares of stock which he later sells for $1500 which he redeposits in the
account. B is entitled to a lien on the account for $1000.
RESTRESTI§ 212
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. © 2004 The American Law Institute.

Analysis of Trust Money

Beginning Balance:
Trust Money
Other
Total Beginning • * £
Transfer trom Salt Lane vui

678,571,
1,031,955
W F B A c C 0 unt:

18,848

16,359

66,637

42,751

30,668

76,596

2,855

121,434

3,608

Trust Money

38,778

710

5,271

Trust Money

Trust Money

T

K

X

* • " " • « « Account:

Trust Money
T r s S o r n S o u t ^ s t ^ F B Account:

T r s K o r e a t B a s i n T r u c K s FSB Account
Trust Money
T

n

^

l

Great Basin TrucKs FSB Account

Trust Money

Receipts
Disbursements

Ending Balance

Beginning Balance:
Trust Money
Other
Total Beginning Balance
Transfer From WFB Concentration Account
Trust Money
Other Money
Transfer To WFB Concentration Account
Associated Foods Truck Payment (Trust Money)
Johnston Supply Truck Payment (Trust Money)
—+other Receipts and Disbursements:
r* Receipts
g^ Disbursements
Ch Ending Balance

~

